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JOINT STAFF PREFACE 
RDML Jeffrey J. Czerewko (Joint Staff, J39) 
Understanding	the	future	of	global	competition	and	conflict	is	now	more	important	than	ever	





• Defend	 their	 interests	 against	 threats	 by	 regional	 competitors	 via	 ways	 and	 means		
complementary	 to	 strategies	 vis-à-vis	 China	 and	 Russia	 but	 do	 not	 undercut	 other	
interests;	and	






the	 level	of	 armed	conflict.	 In	 this	 environment,	 economic	 competition,	 influence	 campaigns,	
paramilitary	actions,	cyber	intrusions,	and	political	warfare	will	likely	become	more	prevalent.	
Such	 confrontations	 increase	 the	 risk	 of	misperception	 and	miscalculation,	 between	 powers	
with	significant	military	strength,	which	may	then	increase	the	risk	of	 	armed	conflict.	In	this	
context,	the	US	capability	to	influence	the	outcomes	of	both	global	and	regional	events	must	be	
reconsidered.	 The	 growing	 divergence	 among	 great	 powers	 (i.e.,	 the	 US,	 China,	 and	 Russia)	























strategic	 objectives	 that	 establish	 an	 uncontested	 sphere	 of	 influence	 in	 the	 post-Soviet	
region.	 Yet,	 Russians	 increasingly	 disagree	with	 the	 Kremlin’s	 assertions	 that	 the	 US	 is	 a	
looming	external	danger	and	a	subversive	force	in	Russian	domestic	politics.	
• Russia’s	gray	zone	tactics	are	most	effective	when	the	target	is	deeply	polarized	or	lacks	the	
capacity	 to	 resist	 and	 respond	 effectively	 to	 Russian	 aggression.	 According	 to	 Russian	
strategic	thought,	deterrence	and	compellence	are	two	sides	of	the	same	coin.	
Only	with	an	aligned	and	synchronized	whole	of	government	approach	will	the	US	compete	and	win	





















Mr. Jason Werchan (USEUCOM Strategy Division & Russia Strategic Initiative (RSI)) 
Understanding	 Russia’s	 broad	 strategy,	 goals,	 and	 capabilities	 in	 the	 gray	 zone	 is	 of	 critical	
importance	 to	 United	 States	 European	 Command	 (USEUCOM).	Russia	 presents	 two	 primary	
challenges	and	tasked	missions	for	the	Command.	The	first,	and	USEUCOM’s	highest	priority,	is	to	
deter	Russian	aggression	against	the	Alliance	(i.e.	the	fight	we	do	not	want).	The	second	is	to	counter	
Russian	 malign	 influence	 and	 activities	 below	 the	 level	 of	 armed	 conflict	 (i.e.	 the	 fight	 we	 are	
currently	in).		
This	White	Paper	directly	supports	this	latter	challenge,	and	highlights	the	global	nature	of	the	gray	
zone	 competition.	 It	 expounds	 upon	 the	 specific	 challenge	 of	 what	 the	 2018	 National	 Defense	
Strategy	directs	as	 ‘Expanding	the	Competitive	Space’	with	Russia.	 ‘Competition’	 is	a	relative	new	
mission	for	the	Department	of	Defense.	While	the	United	States	focused	on	executing	the	global	war	
on	 terror,	 Russia	 actively	 pursued	malign	 influence	 in	 all	 regions	 of	 the	 world	 to	mitigate	 their	
inferior	 conventional	 capability.	 They	 are	 executing	 active	 and	 at	 times	 aggressive	 foreign	 and	
security	policies	in	their	self-proclaimed	near	aboard,	Afghanistan,	and	Syria.	Russia	has	a	growing	
and	 demonstrated	 capacity	 and	 willingness	 to	 exercise	 malign	 influence	 in	 Europe	 and	 abroad,	
including	in	the	United	States.		





areas	 to	 compete	 globally	 and	 challenge	 Russia	 where	 they	 are	 perceived	 to	 have	 asymmetric	














OPENING REMARKS: NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL PERSPECTIVE 







world	events—particularly	 in	areas	close	 to	 its	 locus	of	continental	power	(e.g.,	Crimea,	Donetsk,	
Abkhazia,	 and	other	 regions	 considered	 its	 “near	abroad”).	Needless	 to	 say,	NATO	expansion	has	
infringed	on	Russia’s	perceived	natural	sphere	of	interest	and	serves	as	a	cause	of	friction	between	it	
and	the	US.		
Farther	 afield,	 Russia	 will	 retain	 strategic	 interests	 that	 will	 inform	 and	 guide	 its	 policies.	 Its	
intervention	 in	 Syria	 speaks	 to	 a	 centuries-long	 interest	 in	 attaining	 some	 sort	 of	 geostrategic	
Mediterranean	 foothold.	 Support	 for	 the	 flagging	 socialist	 government	 in	 Venezuela	 can	 be	






making	 dangerous	 progress	 with	 intermediate	 and	 other—including	 long-range—weapons.	






his	 “reset.”	 Trump	 wanted	 to	 do	 this,	 but	 he	 was	 derailed	 by	 the	 electioneering	 apparently	



















Borshchevskaya)	 in	 order	 to	 gain	 economic,	military,	 and	 political	 influence	 over	 nations	
worldwide	and	to	refine	the	liberalist	rules	and	norms	that	currently	govern	the	world	order	
(Lamoreaux)	





























Overall,	 Russia’s	 influence	 abroad	 is	 growing,	 and	 the	 Kremlin	 has	mastered	 the	 use	 of	 “hybrid	
warfare”	in	driving	Russia’s	foreign	policy	(Lamoreaux).	Russia	utilizes	a	variety	of	gray	zone	tactics	
around	 the	globe.	These	 include	 the	use	of	paramilitary	 forces	and	other	proxies,	 interference	 in	
political	processes,	economic	and	energy	exploitation	(particularly	in	Africa),	espionage,	and	media	
and	 propaganda	manipulation.	 Putin	 is	 also	 adept	 at	 blending	military	 and	 civilian	 elements	 for	
maximum	impact	(Weitz).		
The	specific	tactics	of	hybrid	warfare	that	Russia	uses	vary	by	region.	In	Europe,	for	example,	Russia	







connections	 to	 the	 region	 (Laruelle;	 Dyet).	 Likewise,	 in	 Latin	 America,	 Russia	 lacks	 a	 sufficient	














on	 these	actors	(Bragg).	Creating	effective	narratives	 in	each	of	 the	regions	covered	 in	 this	white	
paper	will	be	critical	for	achieving	this	goal	(Kangas;	Bragg).	Furthermore,	the	US	can	counter	specific	
Russian	 gray	 zone	 activities,	 such	 as	 diversifying	 energy	 sources	 to	 reduce	 European	 nations’	
dependence	on	Russia	(Pyatkov;	Werchan)	and	counteracting	propaganda	by	creating	both	resilient	




required	 in	 order	 to	 implement	 a	 true	 whole	 of	 government	 approach	 to	 combatting	 Russian	
influence	activities	abroad	(Werchan).	






Part	 I	 analyzes	 the	 key	 sources	 of	motivation	 or	 interests	 that	 drive	 Russian	 global	 competitive	
activities	and	strategy.	This	part	also	addresses	 the	 fundamental	 issues	being	contested	and	how	
these	issues	impact	enduring	US	national	interests.	
Part	II	examines,	from	a	Russian	perspective,	what	constitutes	legitimate	or	acceptable	deterrence,	











Part I. What Drives Russia’s Global Interests and Strategy? 
Chapter	1:	Dr.	 Jeremy	W.	Lamoreaux	 identifies	 three	motivations	underpinning	Russian	 grand	







globally,	 and	 establishes	 reliable	 constraints	 on	 American	 globe-trotting	 and	 regime-change	
activities.	 Russia's	 ways	 can	 be	 described	 as	 one	 of	 “asymmetric	 balancing"	 through	 gray	 zone	

















Chapter	 5:	 Dr.	 Christopher	Marsh	 takes	 on	 one	 of	 the	most	 significant	 questions	 surrounding	
Russian	foreign	policy:	whether	president	Vladimir	Putin	has	an	overarching	strategy.	In	his	paper,	
he	 describes	 Putin’s	 grand	 strategy	 for	 Russia	 and	 the	 world.	 He	 also	 analyzes	 each	 of	 Russia’s	
interests	and	to	what	degree	they	pose	a	threat	to	vital	US	national	interests.		
Part II. How Does Russia Perceive Deterrence, Compellence, Escalation Management, 





Chapter	7:	Mr.	Daniel	 J.	 Flynn	describes	Russian	 coercive	 strategies	 involving	 the	 orchestrated	
employment	of	nonmilitary	and	military	means	to	deter	and	compel	the	United	States	prior	to	and	
after	 any	 outbreak	 of	 hostilities.	 The	 risk	 to	 the	 US	 is	 that	 these	 strategies	 increase	 the	 risk	 of	
miscalculation	and	escalation	during	a	future	crisis	involving	the	United	States.	
Part III. What Gray Zone Actions Are Russia Undertaking Across the Globe? 
Chapter	 8:	 Dr.	 John	 Schindler	 identifies	 Russian	 activities	 in	 Europe	 within	 a	 historical	 and	
ideological	framework.	In	doing	so,	he	identifies	key	similarities	and	differences	between	the	Putin	
regime	 and	 Tsarist	 Russia,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 regime	 and	 the	 Soviet	 Union.	 Present	 day	 Russian	
institutions	and	religious	discourse	are	examined,	and	Dr.	Schindler	predicts	that	the	Kremlin	will	
act	aggressively	in	a	number	of	domains,	including	the	few	in	which	it	holds	an	advantage	against	the	












influence	 in	 Central	 Asia,	 Russia	 still	 retains	 a	 prime	 position	 as	 “first	 among	 equals,”	 due	 to	 its	
historical,	 linguistic,	 and	 cultural	 connections	 to	 states	 in	 the	 region.	 To	wit,	 Russia	 can	 exercise	
remunerative,	punitive,	and	ideological	power	over	the	states	within	the	bloc.	It	has	tried	to	develop	
its	diplomatic,	economic,	and	military	relationships	with	states	in	the	region,	with	varying	degrees	of	














Chapter	 12:	 Ms.	 Anna	 Borshchevskaya	 highlights	 Russia’s	 series	 of	 multi-faceted	 outreach	
initiatives	in	Africa.	Through	economic,	military,	and	other	means,	Russia	is	creating	an	intentional	
dependence	among	North	Africa’s	military,	political	leaders	and	businessmen	on	continuous	Russian	





























Part IV. How Should the US Counteract Russian Gray Zone Activities Across the Globe? 





United	 States	 can	 strengthen	 its	 allies’	 and	 partners’	 democratic	 systems	 of	 governance,	 while	
reducing	their	dependence	on	Russian	energy	through	diversification	of	energy	sources.	To	counter	











He	 begins	 by	 discussing	 the	 particular	 difficulties	 of	 Central	 Asia,	 geopoltically.	 Among	 the	 sub-



















with	 new	 engagement	 opportunities	 in	 Central	 Asia,	 options	 to	 expand	 US	 influence	 in	 the	 area	









Chapter	 22:	 Dr.	 Joseph	 Siegle	 discusses	 Russian	 interests	 in	 Africa,	 namely	 access	 to	 natural	
resources	and	new	markets	for	Russian	goods,	including	weapons.	He	argues	that,	as	a	result,	Russia	
has	tended	to	support	autocratic	or	uninclusive	regimes,	giving	the	US	an	opportunity	to	distinguish	









peace	 deal	with	 the	 Colombian	 government,	 the	Kremlin	may	 need	 to	 change	 tactics	 in	 order	 to	
maintain	influence	therein.	Colombia’s	complex	political	dynamics,	nevertheless,	provides	a	fertile	
ground	 for	 Russian	 activities,	 spanning	 electoral	 meddling,	 mass	 media	 disinformation,	 and	
hardliners	within	the	FARC.	





capabilities	 to	 both	 influence	 foreign	 populations	 and	 block	 the	 efforts	 of	 others	 to	 manipulate	
popular	sentiment.		
Chapter	 25:	Mr.	 Jason	 Werchan	 argues	 that	 Russia’s	 form	 of	 governance	 gives	 it	 “significant	
flexibility”	and	an	advantage	over	the	US	when	it	comes	to	gray	zone	activities.	The	US	needs	a	true	
whole-of-government	 approach	 to	 counter	 Russia	 in	 this	 area.	 Werchan	 suggests	 that	 the	 US	
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PART I. WHAT DRIVES RUSSIA’S GLOBAL INTERESTS AND STRATEGY? 







international	 liberal	order,	 including	political,	economic	and	societal	 liberalization.	Spreading	this	
agenda	to	Eastern	Europe	has	proved	challenging	as	Russia’s	own	political,	economic	and	societal	
agenda	within	 the	region	often	opposes	 the	Western	 ideal.	One	of	 the	most	significant	sources	of	
conflict	(potential	and	real)	between	Russia	and	the	US	in	Europe	is	the	differing	perceptions	of	how	
the	global	international	system	ought	to	be.	The	US	sees	Europe,	Western,	Central	and	Eastern,	as	
part	 of	 the	US-led	 liberal	 international	 order	 in	which	political,	 economic	 and	 societal	 liberalism	




given	 every	 indication	 that	 they	 do	 not	 intend	 to	 back	 down	 in	 what	 was	 once	 their	 sphere	 of	
influence,	 and	 uses	 these	 differences	 as	 justification	 for	 its	 annexation	 of	 Crimea,	 support	 for	
separatists	in	Donbass,	and	continued	support	for	frozen	conflicts	in	Georgia,	Moldova,	and	between	
Azerbaijan	and	Armenia.	As	such,	 the	US	 faces	 the	challenge	of	promoting	 its	own	agenda	within	
Europe	while	not	provoking	Russia.	This	paper	 looks	at	potential	 road	blocks	 to	engaging	Russia	
constructively,	as	well	as	potential	avenues	moving	forward.		





Three Drivers of Russia’s Competitive Activities and Strategy 














EU	 on	 economic	 and	 ideological	 influence),	 no	 other	 actors	 can	 rival	 the	 US	 across	 all	 these	
measurements.	 Indeed,	 even	 if	 the	 EU	 is	 considered	 as	 a	 potential	 balancer	 to	 US	 economic	
dominance,	 the	 concept	 of	 liberal	 internationalism	 is	 still	 the	 predominant	 “global”	 political-
economic	ideology,	an	ideology	that	both	the	US	and	the	EU	share.	Even	would-be	rivals	such	as	China	
are	not	blind	to	the	liberal	nature	of	the	global	economy.	Nor	is	Russia.	Russia	certainly	wants	to	be	
























who,	more	 than	1000	years	 later,	 comprise	Russians,	Belarusians,	Ukrainians,	 and	quite	possibly	
Moldovans,	Kazakhstanis,	and	other	Slavic	ethnicities	(Suslov,	2015).	Throughout	the	following	1000	
years,	 the	political	 and	 religious	 elite	 in	 the	 region	developed	 stronger	 ties	 to	 the	 extent	 that,	 at	
present,	 they	 lend	 each	 other	 legitimacy	 and	 support	 each	 other	 ideologically	 and	










in	 the	great	power	system.	This	 is	reflected	 in	US	 involvement	 in	 the	Middle	East,	Asia	and,	most	
damning,	the	spread	of	NATO	across	eastern	Europe	and	even	the	former	Soviet	Baltic	States,	all	areas	
where	Russia	sees	themselves	as	having	a	rightful	claim	to	influence	instead	of	the	US.	
Furthermore,	 according	 to	 the	 Kremlin	 view,	 the	 US	 supports	 regime	 change	 in	 less-democratic	
countries	through	democratizing	revolutions	across	the	Middle	East	and	in	Ukraine	and	Georgia,	and	
through	supporting	pro-democracy	protests	in	Russia	in	2011-2012.	To	make	matters	even	worse,	
in	Russia’s	eyes,	 the	very	nature	of	democracy	 is	unstable	(it	does	nothing	to	 further	control	and	
order	within	a	society,	but	facilitates	just	the	opposite),	and	irregular	results	over	the	past	few	years	
(Trump’s	election,	Brexit,	rise	of	nationalist	parties	in	Europe,	and	the	spate	of	election-tampering	




















historical	 precedent,	 they	 claim	 a	 historical	 prerogative	 to	 influence	 there	 (Roberts,	 2017).	
Furthermore,	they	share	a	common	culture	(in	large	part	because	of	a	shared	history)	with	many	of	
the	ethnic	and	linguistic	groups	in	Eastern	Europe.	This	includes	not	only	those	groups	who	share	a	













not	 practiced)	 unites	 Russia’s	 elites.	 Furthermore,	 Western	 Europe’s	 moral	 inclination	 to	 help	










The	US,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 tends	 to	 see	Russian	 influence	 in	 Eastern	Europe	 as	 largely	 negative	
because	it	disrupts	the	spread	of	liberalism	(Taylor,	2018).	Consequently,	the	US	is	not	only	willing	
to	 have	 influence	 in	 Eastern	 Europe,	 but	 also	 willing	 (and,	 arguably,	 eager)	 to	 inhibit	 Russia’s	
influence	there.	As	the	“protector”	of	political	and	economic	liberalism	globally,	the	US	has	the	“right”	
to	protect	those	liberalisms	in	Eastern	Europe,	especially	in	the	face	of	perceived	Russian	opposition	





Europe	 in	 general,	 to	 Russians	 and	 those	 who	 share	 a	 common	 identity	 more	 specifically.	 In	
narrowing	down,	 it	makes	the	discussion	all	the	more	volatile.	Russia	not	only	claims	the	right	to	
protect	 Russians	 on	 political	 and	 economic	 grounds,	 but	 also	 on	 religious	 grounds.	 And,	 this	












































societal	 liberalism	 all	 at	 once	 (in	 fact,	 the	Washington	 Consensus	 failures	 seem	 to	 indicate	 that	
attempting	all	three	at	once	does	not	work).	Rather,	the	US	pushing	economic	liberalism	may	be	the	
























































America’s	 unilateral	 and	 multilateral	 pursuit	 of	 its	 own	 interests	 globally.	 Since	 2007,	 it	 has	
developed	a	sophisticated	set	of	gray	zone	tactics	of	“asymmetric	balancing”	through	which	Russia	
pursues	its	strategic	ends	within	relatively	limited	means.		




policies	 that	 comprise	 the	 states	 deliberate	 efforo	 harness	 political	 military,	 diplomatic,	 and	































objective	 in	recent	years,	 it	 fundamentally	misreads	Russia’s	 true	objective,	which	 is	 to	enjoy	 the	
















agenda	 in	 general.	 Importantly,	 most	 of	 the	 tactics	 used	 to	 pursue	 this	 objective	 of	 American	
constraint	 are	not	 those	of	 traditional	military	balancing.	Rather,	 they	 are	 tactics	 of	 “asymmetric	
balancing,”	which	I	will	discuss	at	greater	length	below.	
These	three	pillars	of	“Yalta	2.0”	—uncontested	sphere	of	influence	in	the	post-Soviet	region,	Russian	
voice	and	 influence	globally,	and	constraint	of	 the	United	States—are	 the	main	 “ends”	of	Russian	
grand	strategy	in	the	21st	century.	





growing	 financial	 resources	 since	 2000	 have	 allowed	 it	 to	 pursue	 ever	 more	 assertive	 ways	 in	










apply	 toward	 its	 grand	 strategic	 objectives	 increased	 tremendously,	 such	 as	 a	 major	 military	
APPROVED	FOR	PUBLIC	RELEASE	
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modernization	 project	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 2008	 war	 with	 Georgia..	 Data	 on	 Russian	 military	
expenditures	 as	 percentage	 of	 GDP	 from	2000-2016	 showed	 that	 a	 broader	 economic	 expansion	
fueled	 expanded	 military	 spending:	 Larger	 defense	 expenditures	 (in	 absolute	 terms)	 were	 the	
consequence	of	 rising	GDP	and	 rising	defense	 spending	 rates	 (World	Bank,	Military	 expenditure,	










pragmatic	 and	 accommodating	 foreign	 policy	 toward	 the	 United	 States	 in	 the	 hope	 of	 gaining	
concessions	on	key	Russian	interests	such	as	preserving	the	anti-ballistic	missile	treaty	and	preveing	
eastward	 NATO	 expansion	 (Kuchins,	 2016).	 This	 approach	 was	 replaced	 by	 a	 policy	 of	 “soft	




Asymmetric balancing – 2007-2019 
The	 period	 of	 “soft	 balancing”	 came	 to	 an	 end	 in	 2007-8	 with	 three	 foreign	 policy	 actions	 that	
demonstrated	 that	Russia	had	 the	means	and	 the	will	 to	go	well	beyond	soft	balancing	 tactics	 to	
promote	its	grand	strategic	interests.	I	label	this	period	one	of	“asymmetric	balancing,”	in	a	nod	to	
the	 asymmetric	 or	 “gray	 zone”	 methods	 of	 hybrid	 warfare	 that	 would	 become	 an	 increasingly	
prominent	part	 of	Russia’s	 foreign	policy	 toolkit	 (Person,	 2018).	We	 can	 conceive	of	 asymmetric	
balancing	as	a	strategy	that	lies	somewhere	between	soft	balancing	tactics	(diplomatic	maneuvering)	
and	hard	balancing	tactics,	like	rearmament	and	alliance	formation.	Or,	more	accurately,	asymmetric	
balancing	 utilizes	 a	 spectrum	 of	 tactics	 that	 range	 from	 soft	 to	 hard,	 though	 kinetic	 military	
operations	are	used	rarely.	Asymmetric	balancing	takes	place	in	the	military,	political,	economic,	and	
social	realms	using	a	variety	of	overt	and	covert	measures	to	exert	influence	and	shape	outcomes.	








the	 attack	 would	 have	 required	 an	 advanced	 level	 of	 centralized	 coordination	 unlikely	 to	 have	
originated	with	 a	 truly	 autonomous	 network	 of	 Russian-speaking	 hackers	 (Herzog,	 2011,	 p.	 53).	
Furthermore,	 the	manipulative	 disinformation	 campaign	waged	 by	 the	 Russian	 government	 and	
Russian	media	following	the	Estonian	government’s	relocation	of	a	Soviet-era	WWII	monument	in	





against	 the	monument’s	 removal	 but	 also	 spread	misinformation	 in	 the	 Russian-language	media	
about	 the	monument’s	 removal	 in	order	 to	 incite	 further	destabilizing	protests	 in	Tallinn	(p.	23).	
Thus,	even	if	it	can’t	be	proven	that	the	Kremlin’s	fingers	were	on	the	kepboard	that	launched	the	
cyberattack,	 its	 fingerprints	were	 all	 over	 the	propaganda	 campaign	 inciting	Russian	 speakers	 in	
Estonia	into	the	streets.	




experience,	making	 crucial	 reforms	 to	 its	 conventional	military	while	 simultaneously	 developing	
more	refined	gray	zone	methods	that	would	be	utilized	against	Ukraine	in	2014.	The	2008	war	is	
interesting	in	its	own	respect	and	is	covered	in	the	detail	it	warrants	elsewhere	in	this	report.	But	for	












































the	 use	 of	 gray	 zone	 methods.	 By	 destabilizing	 Ukraine	 domestically	 through	 intervention	 and	
keeping	 the	 conflict	 in	 the	 Donbas	 simmering,	 Moscow	 has	 simultaneously	 ensured	 that	 NATO	
membership	is	off	the	table	for	Kyiv	while	heightening	the	likelihood	of	regime	change	in	Ukraine.	
Similarly,	 Russia’s	 implied	 threat	 of	 escalating	 the	 war	 in	 the	 Donbas	 deterred	 the	 Obama	
administration	 from	providing	 lethal	weaponry	 to	 the	Ukrainian	military	during	 the	critical	early	
years	of	the	conflict.And	yet,	the	Ukrainian	gambit	cannot	be	taken	as	an	unmitigated	success	in	the	
pursuit	 of	 Yalta	 2.0:	 Poroshenko’s	 government	 in	 Kyiv	 still	 stands,	 American	 military	 advisors	
continue	to	assist	Ukraine	in	its	efforts	to	reform,	and	the	Trump	administration	has	since	provided	






se,	 but	 as	 a	 case	 of	 asymmetric	 balancing	meant	 to	 challenge	 and	 complicate	 NATO	 operations.	
Moreover,	 the	efforts	to	sow	discord	among	the	allies	and	within	the	domestic	populations	of	the	





















of	each	of	 those	episodes	reminds	us	 that	 in	 the	great	game	of	great	power	politics,	every	action	
produces	a	reaction.	Or,	in	the	words	of	Kenneth	Waltz,	“power	begs	to	be	balanced”(Waltz,	2012,	p.	
2).	The	counterbalancing	and	other	unintended	consequences	arising	in	reaction	to	Russia’s	most	
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Chapter 3. Russian Public Opinion as a Potential Obstacle to Aggressive 





Most	Russians	 applaud	 the	 official	 narrative	 that	Russia	 has	 re-emerged	 as	 a	 great	 power	 under	
Vladimir	Putin,	particularly	with	 the	annexation	of	Crimea,	 and	also	agree	with	 the	 claims	of	 the	
Russian	state	that	America	is	an	unfriendly	power.	Yet	they	increasingly	disagree	with	the	assertions	
of	the	Kremlin	that	the	United	States	is	a	looming	external	danger	and	a	subversive	force	in	Russian	




Russian	 elites	 often	differ	 from	 the	 general	 public	 in	 their	 stronger	backing	 for	 a	more	 assertive	
foreign	posture.	Nevertheless,	such	preferences	are	often	moderated	by	a	preoccupation	with	socio-
economic	 problems	 at	 home	 and	 by	 the	 apprehension	 that	 Russia	 will	 neglect	 domestic	
modernization	indefinitely	if	its	foreign	policy	is	confrontational.	Like	Russian	mass	publics,	Russian	
elites	 often	 view	 the	 external	 environment	 as	 dangerous,	 a	 perception	 that	 is	 cultivated	 by	 the	
Kremlin	 to	help	produce	patriotic	 “rally”	 sentiments.	 Yet	 this	 “rally”	 effect	 is	 dulled	by	 the	belief	





surveys	 in	 Russia,	 the	 paper	 concludes	 that	 a	majority	 of	 Russians	 are	 likely	 to	 believe	 that	 the	
Kremlin	 should	 not	 emphasize	 costly	 policies	 intended	 to	 counter	 US	 military	 power	 or	 other	
potential	American	threats.	
Introduction and Context 
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by	March	 2019	 (Levada,	 March	 2019).	 Even	 Putin’s	 approval	 numbers	 have	 suffered	 significant	
decline,	due	in	part	to	an	unpopular	government	proposal	in	mid-2018	to	raise	the	retirement	age.	
Although	a	modest	majority	of	Russians	 (54%	 in	October	2018)	 still	 approve	 “on	 the	whole”	 the	











and	 sociological	 research	 organization	 that	 is	 highly	 respected	 in	 the	 West,	 provided	 a	 similar	
assessment	in	mid-2018.	Gudkov	observed	a	waning	“Crimea	effect”—	popular	approval	of	Russia’s	
foreign	 policy	 as	 a	 reemerging	 great	 power—among	 Russians	who	 increasingly	 believe	 that	 the	
Kremlin’s	 pursuit	 of	 its	 geopolitical	 goals	 comes	 “at	 the	 [social	 and	 economic]	 expense	 of	 the	
population”	 (BBC,	Russkaia	 sluzhba,	 2018).	The	 low	quality	of	health	 care	and	government	 social	





understand	 that	Russia’s	 future,	 and	 their	own,	 “depends	mostly	on	how	ordinary	 citizens	 feel….	
Russia	is	an	autocracy,	but	it	is	an	autocracy	with	the	consent	of	the	governed”	(Trenin,	2016).	Trenin	
echoes	Hans	Morgenthau,	who	identified	“national	morale,”	or	the	“degree	of	determination”	with	
which	 society	 approves	 its	 government’s	 foreign	 policy,	 as	 a	 core	 element	 of	 state	 power.	 For	
Morgenthau,	morale	is	expressed	in	the	form	of	public	opinion,	“without	whose	support	[i.e.,	consent]	
no	government,	democratic	or	autocratic,	is	able	to	pursue	its	policies	with	full	effectiveness,	if	it	is	
able	 to	 pursue	 them	 at	 all”	 (Morgenthau,	 1967).	 While	 most	 Russians	 currently	 back,	 if	 often	
cautiously,	 the	Kremlin’s	 foreign	policy,	 a	 costly	and	unpredictable	escalation	of	 conflict	with	 the	
West	in	the	context	of	Russian	socio-economic	stagnation	or	decline	could	undermine	“consent”	with	
uncertain	political	consequences.	
This	 argument	 is	 developed	 in	 two	 sections	 and	 a	 brief	 conclusion.	 The	 first	 part	 examines	 the	
attitudes	of	the	general	public	in	Russia	on	issues	with	implications	for	Russian	foreign	policy.	The	
second	section	addresses	these	topics	from	the	perspectives	of	segments	of	the	Russian	elite.	The	
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the	divisions	within	Russian	society	on	 this	 central	 issue—and	 the	domestic	political	 risk	 for	 the	
Kremlin	 in	 fomenting	aggression	of	 the	 sort	 feared	by	 the	Baltic	 states.	 It	 is	noteworthy	 that	 the	
villages,	 towns,	 and	 small	 cities	 in	 Russia’s	 “heartland”	 that	 the	 Kremlin	 moved	 to	 activate	 as	
conservative	 counterweights	after	 the	political	protests	 in	2011	and	2012	exhibited	only	modest	
levels	of	approval	for	the	“right	to	protect”	Russians	in	border	countries.	These	population	centers	
were	 slightly	 above	 or	 below	 the	 national	 average	 of	 29.8%	 in	 advocating	 non-intervention.	





A	question	 in	 the	March	2017	Levada	survey	also	probed	how	Russians	would	react	 to	Ukraine’s	
possible	 acceptance	of	 an	 invitation	 to	 join	western	political,	 economic,	 and	 security	 institutions.	
37.7%	of	respondents	overall	thought	that	Russia	should	allow	Ukraine	to	join	either	the	European	
Union	 or	 NATO,	 despite	 that	 country’s	 strong	 historical,	 cultural,	 socio-economic,	 and	 strategic	
importance	to	Russia.	Close	to	48%	of	Muscovites	supported	this	position	as	did	37%	of	respondents	
from	Russia’s	 villages	 and	 towns.	 Opposition	 to	 Ukraine’s	 entry	 into	NATO,	 but	 not	 the	 EU,	was	
expressed	by	27.8%	of	survey	participants.	 Just	under18%	of	respondents	 felt	 that	Russia	should	
“block	any	decision	by	Ukraine	to	join	either	the	EU	or	NATO.”		
Surveys	 on	 attitudes	 toward	 Ukraine	 reveal	 an	 important	 distinction	 in	 how	 Russians	 evaluate	
possible	external	threats:	a	majority	is	less	troubled	by	the	risk	of	foreign	attack	and	more	concerned	
about	Russia	 being	drawn	 into	 a	 conflict	 in	 a	 bordering	 country	 like	Ukraine.	Despite	 significant	
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8%	 of	 respondents	 were	 “absolutely”	 willing	 to	 approve	 policies	 designed	 to	 restore	 Russia’s	
international	 power	 and	 defensive	 capacity	 “even	 if	 these	measures	were	 linked	 to	 a	 significant	
decline	in	their	standard	of	living,”	while	30%	were	“somewhat	willing”	to	endure	such	costs,	for	a	
total	of	38%	(Gorshkov	and	Tikhonova,	90,	96).	23%	of	respondents	were	“absolutely”	unwilling	to	
















state-owned	 enterprises,	 the	 security	 services	 (including	 the	military),	 the	media,	 and	 academic	
research	institutions.		
In	line	with	the	March	2017	Levada	survey	and	other	polls	of	the	Russian	public,	most	of	the	elites	in	





US	 military	 vis-à-vis	 the	 Russian	 military”	 trailed	 far	 behind,	 with	 only	 7.4%	 of	 respondents	
selecting	this	factor	as	an	“utmost	threat”	–	the	lowest	 level	since	the	1993	wave	(7.1%).	Earning	
even	 lower	 percentages	 were	 “border	 conflicts	 in	 the	 CIS	 countries”	 (4.5%),	 “ethnic	 (domestic)	
tensions”	(3.3%),	“information	war	conducted	by	the	West”	(2.5%)	and	“color	revolution”	(2.2%).	
It	 is	 noteworthy	 that	 the	 participants	 in	 different	 waves	 of	 this	 survey	 of	 elites	 found	 domestic	
problems	much	more	worrisome	than	US	military	power,	American	information	warfare,	or	a	“color	
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assessments	of	the	health	of	Russia’s	society	and	political	system	as	well	as	views	on	the	prospects	
for	national	development	over	the	next	five	years.		
Gathered	during	 the	patriotic	upsurge	of	2015,	 the	 results	of	 the	 survey	 challenge	 the	 claim	 that	
Russia	now	enjoys	significantly	greater	solidarity	within	society,	and	between	society	and	the	state.	
At	issue	is	the	strength	of	the	mobilizing		the	Sochi	Olympics,	the	annexation	of	Crimea,	the	ensuing	





Using	 a	 scale	 of	 1	 (lowest)	 to	 10	 (highest),	 the	 first	 question	 of	 the	 survey	 asks	 respondents	 to	



















The	 Russian	 Elite	 2016,	 the	 Institute	 of	 Sociology	 survey	 and	 other	 data	 demonstrate	 that	 while	
Russia’s	elites	are	sensitive	to	international	threats,	a	significant	number	do	not	believe	that	the	West,	






production	 and	 demonstration	 of	 hard	 power.	 From	 this	 standpoint,	 Russians	 often	 view	 the	
pathologies	of	 their	 country’s	developmental	and	political	model	as	 the	most	 important	 threat	 to	
Russia’s	international	influence	and	domestic	well-being.		
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push	 in	 the	 opposite	 direction,	 toward	 an	 aggressive	 foreign	 policy,	 it	 remains	 true	 that	 public	
opinion	matters	to	the	Kremlin	and	that	much	of	Russian	society	at	the	mass	and	elite	level	values	
restraint	in	foreign	policy	and	greater	attention	to	domestic	socio-economic	development.		















































zone	portfolio	 includes	 paramilitary	 forces	 and	 other	 proxies,	 economic	 and	 energy	 exploitation,	
media	and	propaganda	manipulation,	and	additional	assets	Russia’s	hybrid	warfare	approach	blends	
military	 and	 civilian	 elements	 to	 have	 maximum	 impact	 on	 the	 target.	 Hybrid	 tactics	 are	 most	





Tools of Power 
Paramilitary and Other Proxies 
Moscow	has	a	variety	of	military,	paramilitary,	and	non-military	assets	available	for	use	in	hybrid	
operations.	 These	 elements	 include	 Russian	 special	 operations	 units,	 paramilitary	militia	 groups	
associated	with	the	Federal	Security	Service	(FSB)	and	Russian	military	intelligence	(GRU),	hybrid	
businesses	that	are	connected	to	the	Russian	political-economic	elite,	and	Kremlin-friendly	media	
conglomerates.	 Financial	 support	 and	 propaganda	 can	 be	 useful	 in	mobilizing	 a	 disenfranchised	
group	 abroad,	 while	 deploying	 auxiliary	 forces	 like	 local	 volunteer	 militia	 or	 coordination	 with	
intelligence	 offices	 can	 provide	 additional	 tools.	 Russia	 has	 demonstrated	 in	 the	 recent	 Crimean	
conflict	 that	 civilian	 sympathizers	may	be	 employed	 to	 block	military	 installations.	 Furthermore,	




are	 powerful	 force	 multipliers	 to	 establish	 preconditions	 for	 successful	 overt	 or	 semi-overt	
operations.	 They	 can	 mislead	 the	 adversary,	 shape	 public	 opinions,	 and	 pursue	 other	 forms	 of	
subterfuge.	In	the	case	of	the	Crimean	Peninsula,	the	FSB	and	GRU	helped	reconnoiter	the	battlespace	
and	disrupt	Ukrainian	command	and	control	to	impede	a	timely	response.	The	main	value	of	covert	
and	 ambiguous	 forces	 is	 to	 exploit	 weaknesses	 in	 the	 target	 nation.	 However,	 mercenaries,	
independent	nationalists,	warlords,	and	other	proxies	are	motivated	by	their	own	interests	and	their	
actions	 could	 impact	 Russia	 in	 a	 negative	 way.	 For	 example,	 the	 Malaysian	 Airliner	 MH17	 was	
downed	by	Russian-supported	local	militias,	which	were	perhaps	not	acting	under	Moscow’s	orders.	
Information and Influence Operations 





and	 off	 balance,	 and	 influencing	 international	 perceptions	 of	 Russian	 actions	 while	 excluding	
Western	sway	from	Moscow’s	sphere	of	influence.		
Russia’s	information	strategy	is	similar	to	that	of	the	Soviet	Union	during	the	Cold	War.	The	Soviet	
strategy	 of	 maskirovka,	 or	 military	 deception,	 involved	 misleading	 the	 Soviet	 Union’s	 enemies	
regarding	its	military	tactics,	timing,	and	technology.	Soviet	information	warfare	was	closely	related	
to	 the	 concept	 of	 Reflexive	 Control,	which	 has	 been	 defined	 by	 Timothy	 Thomas	 as	 “a	means	 of	
conveying	to	a	partner	or	an	opponent	specially	prepared	information	to	incline	him	to	voluntarily	
make	the	predetermined	decision	desired	by	the	initiator	of	the	action.”		
Contemporary	 Russian	 hybrid	 warfare	 employs	 a	 similar	 strategy,	 though	 it	 has	 evolved	 as	
technology	has	developed.	The	new	approach	has	taken	the	traditional	emphasis	on	psychological	
warfare	found	in	Soviet	conceptualizations	of	propaganda	and	adapted	it	to	use	across	the	new	media	
environment.	 Faster	 communication	 speeds,	 the	 quickening	 of	 the	 news	 cycle,	 and	 the	 highly	
globalized	nature	of	the	21st	century	information	ecosystem	increased	the	effectiveness	of	Russian	
propaganda.	These	 advances	have	made	 it	 easier	 for	 the	Russian	government	 to	 influence	global	
public	opinion	through	the	Internet,	social	media,	24-hour	news	agencies,	and	other	platforms.	
Russian	 media	 activity	 focuses	 both	 on	 disinformation	 and	 enhancing	 Russia's	 image	 abroad.	










sought	 to	 develop	 relations	with	 leftist	 governments	 and	 ties	with	 prominent	 European	 leaders.	
Russia	 also	 employs	 cultural	 organizations	 like	 the	 Russkiy	 Mir	 Foundation	 and	 the	 Russian	
Orthodox	Church	 to	 influence	ethnic	Russians	or	Russian	 speakers	 residing	abroad.	Within	 some	
nearby	 countries,	Moscow	can	 resort	 to	more	explicit	 subversive	 tactics	 such	as	 the	provision	of	
financial	 support	 to	 pro-Russian	 political	 parties	 and	 economic	 bans	 of	 certain	 foreign	 imports	
purported	 to	be	 contaminated	or	unsafe	 for	domestic	use	or	 consumption.	Russia	also	habitually	
funds	 pro-Russian	 domestic	 parties	 in	 other	 states	 and	 takes	 other	 measures	 to	 infiltrate	 both	
European	politics	and	businesses.		
Economics and Energy 
Russia’s	 energy	 and	 economic	 assets—comprising	 oil	 and	 gas	 sales,	 other	 trade	 and	 investment,	














from	 other	 European	 sources	 of	 energy	 and	 render	 it	wholly	 dependent	 on	 Russian	 gas	 and	 oil.	
Furthermore,	the	energy	coercion	has	been	accompanied	by	a	campaign	of	economic	warfare	against	
Ukraine	that	includes	high	tariffs,	embargos,	and	delays	of	imports	designed	to	shape	other	Ukrainian	
policies	 to	 Moscow’s	 benefit.	 	 Moscow	 also	 can	 also	manipulate	 remittances	 of	 foreign	 workers	
working	in	Russia	as	well	as	the	threat	to	expose	foreign	corruption.	
Recommendations 
Hybrid	 tactics	 are	 most	 effective	 when	 the	 target	 state	 has	 lost	 the	 will	 or	 capacity	 to	 resist.	
Conversely,	 countries	 that	 do	 not	 have	 these	 vulnerabilities	 face	 little	 threat	 from	 Russian	




wake	 of	 current	 international	 conflicts.	 Institutional	 and	 analytical	 changes	 are	 essential	 for	
enhanced	 strategic	 awareness.	 Strengthening	 Western	 institutions	 and	 civil	 society	 to	 build	
resilience	against	hybrid	threats	is	imperative.	
US	 responses	 should	 prioritize	 robust	 cyber	 defenses,	 situational	 awareness,	 flexibility,	 and	
deterrence	 at	 the	 strategic,	 operational,	 and	 even	 tactical	 levels.	 The	 United	 States	 must	 adjust	
quickly	to	the	changing	strategies	of	Russian	information	operations,	specifically	the	study	of	Russian	




dialogue	 and	 collaborative	 research	with	 free-thinking	 Russians	 in	ways	 that	 do	 not	make	 them	




and	 economic	measures	 can	make	 it	more	 difficult	 for	Moscow	 to	 undermine	 a	 state.	 Bolstering	
governance	 and	 legitimacy	 can	deprive	Moscow	of	 soft	 targets	 and	opportunities	 for	 subversion.	




regardless	 of	 a	 likely	 tit-for-tat	 response,	 to	 deter	 penetration	 and	 control	 by	 Russian	




• maintaining	 potent	 intelligence	 services	 and	 police	 forces	 and	 providing	 them	 with	 the	










































































• Russian	 recidivism	 is	 a	 threat	 to	 US	 national	 interests,	 particularly	 to	 NATO	 and	 its	 new	
members.	
Motivations Driving Russian Globale Competitive Activities and Strategy 
One	of	the	most	significant	questions	surrounding	Russian	foreign	policy	in	general	and	US-Russian	
relations	in	particular	is	whether	or	not	Russian	president	Vladimir	Putin	has	an	overarching	strategy	
or	 if	 he	 is	 merely	 reacting	 to	 international	 events	 as	 they	 unfold,	 simply	 taking	 advantage	 of	
opportunities	 as	 they	 are	 presented	 to	 him	 by	 the	 international	 system.	 If	 he	 does	 have	 an	








multipolar	world	order,	perhaps	a	Chinese-centric	world.	 It	 is	a	world	in	which	Russia	 is	perhaps	
distant	from	European	values,	but	not	so	distant	from	European	political	and	economic	processes	
and	institutions.	In	this	world,	Eastern	as	well	as	Western	Europe	are	forced	to	“play	nice”	with	Russia	
as	 a	 major	 energy	 source	 and	 political	 and	military	 power.	 The	 same	 holds	 true	 for	 East	 Asia–















In	 response	 to	Russia	being	named	as	a	 target	 in	 the	Pentagon’s	2018	National	Defense	Strategy,	























near	 the	 borders	 of	 Baltic	 states	 and	 kidnapping	 foreign	military	 officers,”	which	 she	 states	 is	 a	
“strange	 strategy,”	 but	 it	 “keeps	 the	Russian	 people	 reliant	 on	 him.	 It	 also	 serves	 as	 an	 effective	
distraction	to	keep	his	illegitimate	rise	to	power	an	afterthought.”	But	Applebaum	concluded	that	it	
“sounds	 odd	 to	 call	 it	 a	 grand	 strategy,	 and	 there's	 a	 way	 in	 which	 it	 really	 isn’t	 even	 about	
geopolitics.”	“What	we’re	watching,”	Applebaum	concludes,	“is	someone	trying	to	stay	in	power	by	












Writing	only	a	 few	years	 later,	Celeste	Wallander	 (2007)	 sees	Putin’s	grand	strategy	as	 less	 than	
grand,	and	is	in	agreement	with	McFaul	that	domestic	issues	are	at	the	center	of	Putin’s	problems.	
But	whereas	McFaul	sees	Putin’s	grand	plan	as	rolling	back	democracy,	Wallander	sees	the	failure	of	










grand	strategy	and	his	actions	vis-à-vis	 the	 former	Soviet	states	 is	a	well-orchestrated	attempt	to	
establish	a	“new	kind	of	union	comprised	of	former	Soviet	republics	and	headed	by	Russia	itself”	(p.	
7).	As	they	argue,	events	between	the	invasion	of	Georgia	in	2008	and	the	armed	seizure	of	Crimea	
in	2014	have	 forced	policy	makers	 and	Russia-watchers	 to	 acknowledge	 the	 “possibility	 that	 the	





into	 a	 single	 nation-state”	 (2018).	 Additionally,	 Gurfinkiel	 sees	 the	 reestablishment	 of	 a	 single	










long-term	horizon,	 to	 2020	 and	 beyond,	 that	Moscow	has	 been	 publishing	 over	 the	 past	 decade.	
Following	Putin’s	 2012	 reelection,	 a	 series	 of	 presidential	 instructions	 and	new	plans	 have	 been	
published	to	update	this	overhaul.	Monaghan	examines	this	commitment	to	strategic	planning	and	





concludes	 by	 exploring	 the	 difficulties	 Moscow	 faces	 including	 the	 evolving	 and	 competitive	
international	environment	and	a	slew	of	domestic	troubles	(and	his	article	was	written	before	the	










Alexander	 Lukin	 recently	 pointed	 out,	 the	 “common	 ideal	 of	 a	 multipolar	 world	 [has]	 played	 a	
significant	role	in	the	rapprochement	between	Russia	and	China”	(2018,	p.	78).	As	Gregory	Karasin	
put	 it	over	 twenty	years	ago,	during	 the	Yeltsin	years,	 the	support	of	 the	 two	great	powers	 for	a	
multipolar	world	was	“particularly	important”	at	that	time	“when	the	international	community	still	
face[d]	 the	 inertia	 of	 the	 way	 of	 thinking	 that	 characterized	 the	 Cold	 War,	 claims	 to	 exclusive	
leadership,	and	attempts	to	reduce	the	development	of	international	relations	to	unipolarity”	(1997,	
p.	16).	This	 is	even	more	so	 the	case	 today,	 some	 twenty	years	 later,	when	Russia	has	recovered	
significantly	from	the	post-Soviet	glut	it	found	itself	in	during	the	1990s	while	China	has	continued	
to	grow	steadily	and	modernize	its	military.	
In the Crosshairs 









Defense	Patrick	Shanahan	on	 “China,	China,	China”—for	all	 indications	are	 that,	 in	 the	 long	 term,	
China	will	dwarf	Russian	military	power	and	present	the	greatest	threat	to	US	interests	and	national	
security.		
Together,	 Russia’s	 tentacles	 on	 its	 former	 Soviet	 neighbors	 and	Moscow’s	 strategic	 alliance	with	
Beijing	in	pursuit	of	a	multipolar	world	(in	which	the	US	is	no	longer	the	global	hegemon)	form	the	
two	main	 pillars	 upon	which	 Putin’s	 grand	 strategy	 rests.	 All	 other	 aspects	 of	 its	 foreign	 policy	
behavior	 can	 be	 traced	 back	 to	 this	 dual-pronged	 grand	 strategy.	 As	 the	 2018	National	 Defense	
Strategy	 puts	 it,	 “Russia	 seeks	 veto	 authority	 over	 nations	 on	 its	 periphery	 in	 terms	 of	 their	
governmental,	economic,	and	diplomatic	decisions,	to	shatter	the	North	Atlantic	Treaty	Organization	






The	enduring	national	 interests	of	 the	United	States	are	 the	support	of	 freedom,	 liberty,	and	 free	
markets	 around	 the	 globe.	 Our	 friends	 and	 allies	 figure	 prominently	 here,	 as	we	 ally	with	 other	
democracies	and	regimes	that	share	our	values.	Such	was	the	justification	for	the	expansion	of	NATO,	






as	 a	 critical	 component	 of	 the	 international	 system.	 Russia	 thus	 presents	 a	 challenge	 to	 these	
interests,	not	only	in	Europe,	but	all	along	its	border,	particularly	in	countries	with	significant	pockets	













































PART II. HOW DOES RUSSIA PERCEIVE DETERRENCE, COMPELLENCE, 
ESCALATION MANAGEMENT, AND THE CONTINUUM OF CONFLICT? 

















of	 conventional	 forces	or	 to	 employ	nuclear	weapons	 is	 a	 time-tested	 tool	of	 the	Kremlin’s	 crisis	
management	strategy.		
Deterrence, Compellence, and the Continuum of Conflict—A Russian Perspective 
To	 understand	 the	 Russian	 view	 of	 deterrence,	 compellence,	 and	 the	 continuum	 of	 conflict,	 it	 is	
critical	to	begin	with	a	recognition	of	the	fact	that	these	are	political-legal	constructs	that	are	derived	
from	a	Western	philosophical-normative	tradition.	Moreover,	Russian	leaders	believe	that	the	US	and	
its	 allies	 are	 attempting	 to	 impose	 on	 Russia	 these	 legal	 constructs	 along	 with	 those	 that	 are	
foundational	to	democratic	governance	and	the	existing	international	order.	To	the	Kremlin	this	is	
hostile	behavior	that	has	the	purpose	of	preventing	Russia	from	taking	its	rightful	place	as	a	great	
power.	 In	addition,	 the	 imposition	of	a	Western	political-legal	culture	would	threaten	the	current	
leadership’s	hold	on	power.		











having	 to	 fight	 a	 sophisticated	 international	 counterinsurgency	 campaign	 against	 the	 West,	 in	
general,	and	NATO	and	the	United	States,	in	particular.	
As	viewed	 from	Moscow,	 the	war	 is	not	 total,	 but	 it	 is	 fundamental.	 For	Russia,	 the	war	 is	 about	
overturning	the	existing	international	order	in	order	to	create	an	environment	in	which	the	Kremlin	




As	Putin	and	other	Russian	 leaders	have	made	clear,	 this	war	 is	one	using	primarily	non-military	
means	and	intended	to	destabilize	the	Russian	government	and	political	system.	The	threat	they	fear	
is	one	of	political	destabilization	at	home.	 In	 effect,	 the	principal	 threat	 to	Russian	 security	 is	 an	
insurgency,	but	one	that	exists	not	simply	within	Russia	but	outside	it	as	well.		 	
President	 Putin’s	 decision	 is	 influenced	 by	 Russia’s	 experiences	 since	 the	 end	 of	 the	 Cold	War–
internal	coup	attempts,	terrorist	attacks,	‘colored	revolutions’	around	Russia,	wars	inside	and	outside	
of	Russia,	unfinished	reforms,	and	perceptions	of	Russia’s	natural	vulnerability	to	a	fate	similar	to	





forms	 of	 deterrence,	 compellence,	 or	 coercion.	 The	 war	 is	 being	 fought	 on	 multiple	 levels	
simultaneously	and	with	all	means	available,	if	not	in	every	way.	The	Russian	strategy	seeks	to	move	
seamlessly	 between	 political/diplomatic	 activities,	 economic	measures,	 para-military	 operations,	
and	the	employment	of	conventional	and,	finally,	nuclear	forces.	The	use	of	non-military	means	or	
what	the	West	identifies	as	para-military	forces	is	preferable	largely	because	it	is	more	efficient	than	
employing	 classic	 military	 forces	 and	 because	 Russia	 could	 be	 called	 the	 West’s	 equal	 or	 even	
superior	in	these	capabilities.	
Russia	has	made	use	of	the	limited	means	at	its	disposal	both	to	deter	the	West	and	to	further	its	












































within	 its	sphere	of	 influence.	The	situation	 in	Eastern	Ukraine	 is	an	example	of	a	 frozen	conflict.	
While	Moscow	would	 like	 to	have	Ukraine	 in	 its	orbit,	 it	 is	preferable	 to	ensure	 that	 this	country	
remain	weak	and	in	a	state	of	perpetual	internal	division	than	that	it	shifts	allegiance	to	the	West.		






the	 international	 environment	 while	 simultaneously	 countering	 Western	 actions	 that	 threaten	
Russia	or	its	desired	sphere	of	influence.	
The	Kremlin	has	long	employed	non-kinetic	means,	from	information	warfare	to	cyber	operations	














Information	 operations,	 conducted	 prior	 to	 onset	 of	 hostilities	 would	 be	 directed,	 in	 part,	 to	
sensitizing	 Western	 leaders	 and	 populations	 to	 the	 risks	 associated	 with	 any	 effort	 to	 counter	
Russian	aggression.	
In	Russian	strategic	 thought,	deterrence	and	compellence	are	 two	sides	of	 the	same	coin.	For	 the	





most	 effective	 coercion	 is	 achieved	 with	 a	 minimum	 employment	 of	 military	 force.	 Russia	 is	
developing	an	array	of	informational,	conventional,	and	nuclear	means	to	allow	it	to	pursue	‘cross-
domain	coercion’	(Adamsky,	2017,	p.	1-28).	formation	operations	work	across	all	potential	domains	





















lities	rely.	Even	 limited	nuclear	strikes	at	 the	outset	of	a	conflict	are	a	 form	of	escalation	control.	

































deterrence	 has	 evolved	 as	 its	 capabilities	 and	 assessment	 of	 the	 strategic	 environment	 changed.	
Russian	 military	 planners	 are	 adopting	 comprehensive	 approaches	 to	 deterrence	 involving	 the	
orchestrated	 employment	 of	 nonmilitary	 and	 military	 means,	 including	 information,	 space,	
conventional	 military,	 and	 nuclear	 capabilities.	 Russia’s	 concepts	 also	 include	 options	 for	
preemptively	employing	force	to	induce	shock	and	dissuade	an	adversary	from	conducting	military	
operations	 and	 to	 compel	 a	 de-escalation	 of	 hostilities.	 In	 response	 to	 a	 threat	 of	 US	 military	
intervention	 that	 challenge	 Russian	 vital	 interests,	 Moscow	 would	 probably	 seek	 to	 use	 these	
approaches	to	dissuade	and	compel	Washington	to	limit	US	actions	and	prevent	the	outbreak	of	a	
significant	military	 conflict	 and,	 failing	 that,	manage	 escalation	 and	 induce	 a	 de-escalation	 in	 an	
attempt	to	end	the	conflict	on	favorable	terms.		
How Russia Defines “Deterrence” 
Russian	strategists	define	the	concept	of	“deterrence”	in	their	military	publications	differently	than	
the	 United	 States.	 Russian	 discussions	 of	 “deterrence”	 include	 elements	 of	 both	 dissuasion	 and	
compellence	and	is	more	analogous	to	what	the	US	military	would	define	as	coercion.	For	example,	
according	to	Dima	Adamsky	(2015),	Russian	professional	discourse	often	mixes	the	terms	coercion,	
deterrence,	 and	 compellence	 and	 uses	 them	 interchangeably.	 This	 is	 not	 just	 simply	 an	 issue	 of	
translation	 or	 variations	 in	 terminology.	 It	 is	 a	 difference	 in	 fundamental	 mindset.	 In	 Russian	
concepts,	“deterrence”	actions	can	occur	in	times	of	peace	and	crisis	to	prevent	war	and	support	the	





realm	 of	 “deterrence”	 and	 conducting	 defensive	 actions	 with	 the	 intent	 of	 preventing	 further	
hostilities	and	de-escalating	the	crisis.	Failure	to	understand	this	mindset	could	create	conditions	for	
miscalculation	and	unintentional	escalation	of	future	crises.	
Russia’s Evolving Approach to Deterrence 
Since	 the	 end	 of	 the	 Cold	 War,	 Russian	 military	 strategists	 have	 redefined	 their	 approach	 to	
deterrence	 in	 response	 to	 changes	 in	 the	 strategic	 security	 environment	 and	 Russian	 military	
capabilities.	 Kristen	 Ven	 Bruusgaard	 (2016),	 in	 her	 study	 of	 Russian	 “strategic	 deterrence,”	 has	





the	 post-Cold	War	 period	 rather	 than	 discrete	 strategies.	 Since	 the	 1990s,	 Russia’s	 approach	 to	
deterrence	has	expanded,	shifting	from	a	focus	on	nuclear	weapons	to	incorporating	conventional	
military	and	nonmilitary	means	as	Russian	capabilities	continued	to	advance.		
The Emergence of the Theory of “Nuclear De-Escalation” 
By	the	late	1990s,	Russian	military	strategists	realized	they	had	a	problem.	Although	the	Cold	War	
was	over	and	a	global	nuclear	war	with	the	United	States	was	extremely	unlikely,	Russia	still	faced	







Given	 the	 deteriorated	 condition	 of	 Russian	 conventional	 military	 capabilities,	 Russian	 military	
strategists	 considered	how	 to	 employ	Russia’s	 nuclear	 arsenal	 in	 a	 regional	 conflict	 to	prevent	 a	
significant	 intervention	 by	 a	 superior	 conventional	 military	 force.	 The	 problem	 for	 Russian	
strategists	was	 how	 to	make	 the	 threat	 of	 nuclear	weapons	 appear	 credible	 to	 have	 the	 desired	
“deterrent”	effect	(S.	Yu.	et	al,	2000).	To	have	a	credible	coercive	capability,	these	strategists	believed	
Russia	had	to	demonstrate	its	willingness	to	employ	nuclear	weapons	in	response	to	an	intervention	
by	 a	 conventionally	 superior	 adversary	while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 limiting	 the	 potential	 for	 further	
escalation	to	a	strategic	nuclear	exchange.	This	thinking	led	to	the	theory	of	nuclear	de-escalation.	
This	 theory	 assumes	 that	Moscow’s	 vital	 national	 interests	would	be	more	 at	 stake	 in	 a	 regional	
conflict	on	Russia’s	periphery	than	that	of	potential	adversary,	such	as	the	United	States	or	other	
NATO	members.	By	employing	nuclear	weapons	early	in	such	a	conflict,	Moscow	would	demonstrate	
that	 the	costs	 involved	would	outweigh	any	benefits	an	adversary	would	hope	 to	obtain	 through	
military	operations.		
The	theory	also	argued	that	constraining	the	physical	impact	of	the	nuclear	weapons	employed	to	










The Development of “Nonnuclear Deterrence”  
Although	 the	 Russian	 military	 establishment	 agreed	 on	 the	 continued	 role	 of	 Russian	 strategic	
nuclear	weapons	in	deterring	global	nuclear	war,	debate	continue	during	the	2000s	over	the	viability	
of	using	nuclear	weapons	alone	to	prevent	or	de-escalate	large-scale	regional	conventional	conflicts	
(Blank,	 2011).	 Russian	 strategists	 continued	 to	 argue	 whether	 the	 use	 of	 nuclear	 weapons	 in	 a	







strike	weapons	might	play.	 In	 the	early	2000s,	 former	Deputy	Defense	Minister	Andrei	Kokoshin	
argued	 that	 there	 were	 limits	 to	 “nuclear	 deterrence”	 and	 that	 Russia	 needed	 to	 invest	 in	





conventional	 weapons	 had	 the	 potential	 to	 prevent	 or	 control	 military	 aggression	 by	 imposing	
damage	that	would	be	unacceptable	to	an	adversary.	A	number	of	Russian	strategists	and	officials	
argued	 in	 favor	 using	 such	 strikes	 preemptively	when	US	 or	NATO	 attacks	 against	 Russia’s	 vital	



























social	 media	 and	 other	 informational	 means	 to	 shape	 public	 opinion	 to	 dissuade	 opposition	 to	
Moscow’s	actions	or	manipulating	 the	supply	of	Russian	energy	resources	 to	persuade	 importing	
states	to	alter	their	behavior.	The	principle	nonmilitary	measures	employed	in	“strategic	deterrence”	
would	 include	 political,	 diplomatic,	 legislative,	 economic,	 informational,	 psychological,	 and	moral	






 “Strategic Deterrence” and the Russian Way of War 
Russia’s	concept	of	“strategic	deterrence”	is	integral	to	Russia’s	current	approach	to	warfare.	Russian	












conduct	 conventional	 strikes	 in	 anticipation	 of	 an	 adversary’s	 imminent	 military	 operations	 to	
compel	 the	 adversary	 to	 reconsider	 and	 to	 deter	 further	 hostilities.	 If	 conventional	 strikes	 are	
insufficient	 to	 compel	 an	 adversary	 to	 de-escalate,	 Russian	 doctrine	 and	 statements	 by	 Russian	
officials	suggests	Moscow	would	threaten	and	potentially	employ	limited	nuclear	strikes	to	convince	
the	 adversary	 that	 the	 costs	 of	 further	 military	 intervention	 outweighs	 any	 expected	 benefits	
(Matvichuck	&	Khryapin,	2010).	See	Table	1.	
Implications for Future Crisis Dynamics 
Russia’s	 approaches	 to	 deterrence	 raise	 the	 risk	 of	 miscalculation	 on	 both	 sides.	 The	 factors	




impede	Russia’s	 ability	 to	 clearly	 signal	 their	 intentions	 in	a	 crisis.	Russia’s	 thresholds	 for	 taking	
preemptive	and	other	compellent	actions	appear	ambiguous,	 raising	 the	risk	 that	at	an	opponent	
might	 trigger	 a	 forceful	 response	 unintentionally.	 It	 also	 possible	 that	 Russian	 military	 officials	
themselves	may	not	know	prior	to	a	crisis	the	exact	conditions	at	which	certain	actions	would	occur.	
Dima	Adamsky	(2015,	p.	18),	for	example,	notes	that	as	of	at	least	the	fall	of	2015	Russian	strategic	
















manage	 escalation	 in	 a	 future	 crisis.	 Russia’s	 approach	 to	 deterrence	 include	 the	 use	 of	 new	
capabilities,	 such	 as	 cyber	 and	 counterspace	 weapons,	 for	 which	 there	 is	 a	 lack	 of	 mutual	
understanding	 with	 the	 United	 States	 as	 to	 implications	 the	 use	 of	 these	 weapons	 will	 have	 on	
escalation	 dynamics	 during	 a	 crisis	 situation.	 A	 lack	 of	 mutually	 agreed	 upon	 norms	 between	
countries	 on	 the	 use	 of	 such	 weapons	 and	 where	 they	 fall	 on	 the	 “escalation	 ladder”	 creates	 a	
situation	 ripe	 for	miscalculation	 and	 inadvertent	 conflict.	 The	 speed	 of	modern	 conflict	will	 also	
challenge	Russian	military	officials	to	assess	the	effect	of	their	deterrent	actions	and	adapt	quickly	in	
a	rapidly	changing	situation.	Modern	military	capabilities	such	as	cyber,	anti-satellite	weapons,	and	
long-range,	 high-speed	 missiles—including	 potentially	 hypersonic	 weapons	 in	 the	 future—can	
decrease	the	time	for	making	decisions	and	evaluating	responses	in	a	conflict.		













































































































PART III. WHAT GRAY ZONE ACTIONS ARE RUSSIANS UNDERTAKING 
ACROSS THE GLOBE? 









just	 a	 political	 and	 military	 rivalry.	 Although	 NATO	 continues	 to	 possess	 impressive	 overmatch	
against	Moscow,	 that	edge	 is	dwindling,	 and	Western	vulnerabilities	 in	 certain	military	areas	are	
alarming.	 Moreover,	 the	 unwillingness	 of	 Western	 experts	 and	 governments	 to	 confront	 the	
ideological	–	as	well	as	political	and	military	–	aspects	of	our	rivalry	with	Putinism	means	that	the	
threat	of	significant	armed	conflict	is	rising.		














overvalued	 by	 Western	 commentators.	 Although	 Putin	 rules	 with	 help	 from	 oligarchs	 and	 has	
become	 a	 billionaire	 himself	 thanks	 to	 those	 close	 and	 mutually	 beneficial	 relationships,	 top	










where	 he	 denounced	 the	West	 as	 godless	 and	 even	 Satanic,	 deserved	more	 attention	 than	 they	
received	abroad (Schindler,	2014).	
These	 themes	became	 regime	propaganda,	 and	 the	 events	 of	 2014	were	hailed	by	Putin	with	 an	
unprecedented	dose	of	Russian	 (russkiy	 not	 rossiskiy	 3)	 nationalism,	 combined	with	Third	Rome-
flavored	religious	mysticism	with	the	staunch	backing	of	the	Russian	Orthodox	Church,	which	has	
become	a	major	supporter	of	the	regime	and	the	de	facto	state	religion	under	Putin.4	This	heady	brew	





really	 is	 one	 (or	 not)	 is	 immaterial	 to	 the	 prominent	 role	 that	 Russian	 Orthodoxy	 now	 plays	 in	
creating	 pro-regime	 ideas	 and	 actions	 among	 average	 Russians.	 This	 hearkens	 back	 to	 ancient	






motivated	 its	 purveyors’	 aggression.	 Similarly,	 it	 is	 now	 imperative	 for	Westerners	 to	 grasp	 the	
Putinist	ideology,	what	motivates	it,	and	why	it	is	encouraging	more	confrontation	–	not	conciliation	
–	with	the	West.	
The Special Services 
One	aspect	of	Putinism	that	is	unique	in	Russian	history	is	the	dominant	role	of	the	security	agencies,	
what	 Russians	 term	 the	 ‘special	 services,’	 in	 nearly	 all	 regime	 affairs.	 The	 dominance	 of	 these	
secretive	agencies	in	the	formulation	of	policy,	foreign	and	domestic,	has	no	precedent	in	Russian	
history,	 which	 for	 centuries	 has	 valued	 its	 spy	 services	 more	 than	 Western	 countries	 do.	 The	






Moscow	 who	 didn’t	 grow	 up	 in	 the	 Soviet	 intelligence	 apparatus,	 military	 or	 civilian.	 They	 are	
‘Chekists’	to	use	the	proper	term	and	Putin	himself	famously	stated,	‘there	are	no	“former’	Chekists.”5	





















































Such	messages	 seem	 laughable	 to	 the	West	 but	 are	 taken	 seriously	 by	many	 Russians,	 not	 least	
because	they	possess	deep	resonance	with	centuries	of	their	history,	which	has	long	preached	about	










What Putin Wants 
We	have	no	idea	what	Putin	‘really’	believes	as	a	matter	of	faith,	but	in	practical	terms	he	is	a	hard-
headed	realist	who	is	fundamentally	cautious	–	in	2014-15	he	repeatedly	turned	down	General	Staff	








































EUCOM’s	 current	 force	 posture	 in	 the	 AOR	 is	 inadequate	 to	 realistically	 deter	 possible	 Russian	
adventurism	 on	 the	 Atlantic	 Alliance’s	 eastern	 edge.	 Deficits	 in	 artillery	 and	 EW	 are	 especially	
serious,	while	overall	NATO	readiness	to	contest	possible	Russian	aggression	in	Eastern	Europe	is	
lacking.	


















                                               
7	This	author	coined	the	term	“Russia’s	Special	War”	in	2014,	see:	Higgins,	A.,	Gordon,	M.	R.,	&	Kramer,	A.	E.	(2017,	December	



























Russia	 continues	 to	 present	 a	 threat	 to	 the	United	 States	 in	 Europe,	 specifically	 through	 the	 use	
of	media,	 trade	relations,	 foreign	direct	 investment,	energy	 trading,	diplomacy,	military	posturing	
(war	games,	air	and	sea	space	violations),	interference	in	the	political	processes,	and	the	continuation	
of	frozen	conflicts.	In	short,	the	Kremlin	has	mastered	the	use	of	“hybrid	warfare”	in	driving	their	
foreign	 policy.	 By	 such	methods,	 Russia	 potentially	 undermines	US	 interests	 in	 Europe	 far	more	
effectively	than	if	they	were	to	pose	any	sort	of	direct	military	threat. 
Russian Gray Zone Actions in Europe 
Primary Russian Interests and Objectives 
Russia’s	primary	interests	in	Eastern	Europe	are:	to	maintain,	or	regain,	its	sphere	of	influence;	to	
protect	and	preserve	the	identities	of	Russians	living	in	the	region,	as	well	as	the	identities	of	others	
who	 share	 a	 common	 language,	 culture,	 religion	 and	 ethnicity;	 to	 limit	 the	 influence	 of	Western	
Europe	and	the	US	in	Eastern	Europe.		
Recent Actions Short of Armed Conflict in Europe 
There	are	the	regular	avenues	Russia	uses	in	foreign	policy:	the	media,	trade	relations,	foreign	direct	
investment,	energy	trade	manipulation,	diplomacy,	military	posturing	(war	games,	air	and	sea	space	






specialized	 training.	 Rather,	 Russia	 can	 easily	 use	 the	 already-existing	 discontent	 among	 ethnic	
Russian	populations	in	the	Baltic	States	who,	in	many	cases,	have	limited	rights	simply	by	virtue	of	
their	status	as	ethnic	and	linguistic	minorities.	Furthermore,	this	population	extensively	consumes	















societal	 divisions	 across	 the	 West.	 In	 doing	 so,	 Russia	 effectively	 divides	 society,	 weakens	 civil	
society,	 and	 undermines	 the	 potential	 bi-or	 multi-partisan	 nature	 of	 a	 functioning	 democracy.	
Though	potentially	extreme,	and	not	necessarily	realistic	in	the	immediate	future,	societal	divisions	
could	 become	 so	 dilapidating	 that	 Russia	 simply	 has	 to	 exaggerate	 and	 enhance	 differences	 (so	
effectively	done	through	social	media),	and	then	watch	the	West	tear	itself	apart.	Even	if	Russia	does	





Russian Influence Activities Among Key Regional Actors and Civilian Populations 
Russia	 is	 attempting	 to	 influence	 key	 regional	 actors	 in	 Europe	 primarily	 through	 media,	 trade	
relations,	foreign	direct	investment,	energy	trading,	diplomacy,	military	posturing	(war	games,	air	
and	 sea	 space	 violations),	 interference	 in	 the	 political	 processes,	 and	 the	 continuation	 of	 frozen	
conflicts.	It	is	interesting	to	note	here	that	two	of	the	primary	states	in	Western	Europe,	(Germany	
and	France)	are	not	patently	opposed	to	taking	a	softer	approach	toward	Russia	than	the	US	or	the	
UK.	 While	 both	 Germany	 and	 France	 are	 still	 supporting	 sanctions,	 both	 have	 also	 indicated	 a	
willingness	to	engage	with	Russia	more	as	equals	(implying	they	may	not	view	all	of	Russia’s	actions	
in	Eastern	Europe	as	aggressively	as	the	US,	the	UK	and	others	view	them).	Perhaps	they	may	respect	
Russia’s	 views	 of	 power	 balances	 and	 spheres	 of	 influence.	 With	 Brexit	 pending,	 this	 could	
significantly	change	 the	EU’s	approach	 to	Russia	and,	 in	 that	vein,	 toward	Eastern	Europe.	At	 the	
extreme,	this	could	portend	very	ill	for	the	Baltic	States.		
Russia	 is	 attempting	 to	 influence	 key	 civilian	 polulations	 in	 Europe	 primarily	 through	 media:	
traditional	 and	 social.	 Russia	 is	 very	 good	 at	 arguing	 that	 they	 occupy	 a	 high	 ground	 vis-à-vis	 a	
morally	defunct	West	(with	its	increasing	secularization	and	promotion	of	“non-traditional”	practices	
such	as	the	LGBTQ	lifestyle	and	abortion).	Unfortunately,	selling	the	moral	high	ground	to	ethno-
linguistic	 Russians	 is	 not	 so	 difficult	 in	 Estonia	 and	 Latvia	 as	 both	 states	 have,	 to	 some	 extent,	
sidelined	ethnic	Russians,	many	of	whom	have	lived	in	those	states	all	 their	 lives.	Additionally,	 in	
Europe	more	generally,	Russia	doesn’t	need	to	promote	any	sort	of	agenda	specific	to	themselves.	
They	 simply	need	 to	 encourage	discord	between	groups,	which	 they	effectively	do	by	promoting	
nationalism.		
Perceived Russian Threats in Europe 
Russia	perceives	NATO	as	 the	primary	 threat	 to	 its	 interests	 in	Europe.	Again,	Kremlin’s	 focus	 is	
spheres	 of	 influence	 and	 a	 balance	 of	 power.	 NATO	 expansion	 into	 the	 Baltic	 States,	 and	 talk	 of	
expansion	into	Georgia	and	Ukraine,	throw	both	off.	Additionally,	though,	the	Kremlin	sees	the	spread	
of	 democracy	 as	 a	 threat	 to	 the	 current	 Putin	 administration.	 Democracy	 in	 Eastern	 Europe	 is	
primarily	promoted	by	the	EU	through	the	European	Neighborhood	Policy	(ENP)	and	the	Eastern	
Partnership	 (EaP).	 However,	 as	 both	 programs	 are	 largely	 uninfluential	 (with	 no	 promise	 of	 EU	




Looking to the Future 
Potential Future Russian Activities in Europe 
Russia	 will	 continue	 to	 use	 all	 of	 the	 avenues	 previously	 mentioned	 in	 this	 paper.	 Where	 open	
military	 aggression	 would	 provoke	an	 equally	 aggressive	response	 from	 the	 West,	 this	 sort	 of	
tampering	(often	referred	to	as	hybrid	warfare)	could	well	elicit	a	subdued	or	hesitant	response	from	
the	US	or	Western	Europe.	 Specifically,	Russia	will	 continue	 to	put	 even	more	effort	 into	 sowing	












eastern	 Ukraine,	 and	 giving	 Crimea	 back	 to	 Ukraine.	 Russia	 would	 need	 to	 decrease	 political	
interference	in	the	West.	Essentially,	Russia	would	need	to	stop	doing	everything	the	US	dislikes.		
From	the	Russian	perspective,	a	win-win	looks	like	NATO	removal	from	the	Baltic	States	(both	the	
presence	 currently	 there	 and,	 ultimately,	 membership	 in	 general),	 though	 Russia	 would	 not	 be	
opposed	to	the	Baltic	States	remaining	members	of	the	EU.	It	looks	like	the	Baltic	States	recognizing	
ethnic	Russians	as	equal	citizens,	 including	Russian	as	an	official	 language	 in	at	 least	Estonia	and	








Two	 final	 thoughts.	 First,	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘relative	 deprivation’	 argues	 that	when	 one	 group	 feels	
deprived	relative	to	another	group,	and	perceives	that	the	system	perpetuates	the	deprivation,	the	
deprived	 group	 is	more	 inclined	 to	 drastic	 action	 to	 change	 a	 ‘defunct’	 system.	 This	 can	 include	
everything	from	protests	to	violence	or	even	revolution.	It	is	important	to	note	that	there	need	not	
be	any	actual	deprivation:	just	the	perception	that	there	is	deprivation	(which	is	where	social	media	













Europe	 and	 could	 set	 the	 region	back	 even	 further.	With	 that	 in	mind,	 the	US	needs	 to	maintain	
influence	in	areas	that	are	already	part	of	the	EU	and/or	NATO.	Steps	like	those	mentioned	above	will	




















the	most	 enduring,	 because	 it	 is	 not	 purely	 state-centric	 but	 is	 embedded	 in	 social	 and	 cultural	
interactions	between	Russian	and	Central	Asian	societies. 
Russian Gray Zone Activites—Central Asia 
Russian Interests and Objectives 
Central	Asia	represents	a	necessary	piece	to	secure	Moscow’s	proclaimed	role	as	the	pivot	of	a	larger	
Eurasian	 region,	 though	not	 at	 the	 level	 of	 the	 contested	neighborhood	of	Ukraine	 and	Moldova.	
Central	Asia	is	a	natural	gateway	to	vast	territories	to	the	east	and	south	of	Russia’s	borders,	as	well	
as	part	of	a—still	potential—North–South	Eurasian	transportation	corridor.		
Russia’s	 interaction	 with	 the	 region	 is	 unparalleled	 by	 any	 other	 external	 actor.	 Kazakhstan,	
Kyrgyzstan,	 and	 Tajikistan	 constitute	 the	 core	 of	 Russia-led	multilateral	 institutions	 in	 the	 post-
Soviet	space,	both	in	security	(Collective	Security	Treaty	Organization)	and,	for	the	former	two,	in	





votes	at	 the	UN	General	Assembly,	 though	Moscow	 is	 sometimes	disappointed	with	 the	positions	
taken	by	the	bloc	nations.	
Russian	remains	to	a	 large	extent	the	 lingua	franca	of	the	region,	and	many	Central	Asian	natives	
continue	 to	 be	 educated	 in	 Russian	 universities.	 Russian	 diasporas,	 while	 they	 have	 shrunk	
throughout	Central	Asia,	still	play	important	economic,	political,	and	cultural	roles	in	Kazakhstan	and	
Kyrgyzstan	(Laruelle,	2016).	Central	Asia	also	remains	the	main	source	of	labor	migrants	to	Russia.	
Finally,	 the	 rapidly	 growing	 Chinese	 presence	 in	 Central	 Asia	 increases	 incentives	 for	 regional	
economic	and	political	elites	to	rely	on	Moscow—among	other	actors—as	a	counterweight	to	Beijing.	
As	the	leadership	transition	in	Tashkent	in	September	2016	demonstrated,	Russia’s	relations	with	















interactions	 between	Russian	 and	 Central	 Asian	 societies.	 This	 ideological	 power	 can	 be	 studied	
through	 the	 normative	 influence	 of	Russia	 over	 Central	 Asian	 societies,	which	 expresses	 itself	 at	
multiple	levels:		
• Institutionally,	by	consolidating	the	authoritarian	status	quo—from	validating	local	elections	
and	 maintaining	 socializing	 mechanisms	 (contacts	 between	 presidential	 administrations,	
Security	Councils,	Parliamentary	exchanges)	to	shaping	the	definition	of	regime	security	as	
similar	to	state	security	(Jackson,	2010;	Roberts,	2015).	Russia's	emphasis	on	stability,	state	
authority,	 and	 non-interference	 suit	 the	 Central	 Asian	 governments	 better	 than	 political	









Russian Influence Activities—Key Civilian Populations 
Russia	media	presence	constitutes	probably	the	main	tool	of	influence	over	civilian	populations	in	
















in	 Russia.	 This	 parallel	 is	 less	 evident	 in	 Uzbekistan,	 yet	 compared	 to	 many	 other	 post-Soviet	
countries,	Uzbek	public	opinion	can	still	be	considered	closely	aligned	with	its	Russian	counterpart.	
We	have	almost	no	information	for	Turkmenistan.	In	2015,	the	US	Broadcasting	Board	of	Governors	
and	 the	Gallup	Organization	published	a	 series	of	 surveys	conducted	 throughout	 the	whole	post-
Soviet	region	(Broadcasting	Board	of	Governors,	2016).	These	surveys	show	unambiguously	that	in	











However,	 Russian	 media	 have	 failed,	 partly	 or	 largely,	 to	 produce	 a	 narrative	 on	 Central	 Asian	












into	question	 the	 integrity	of	Moscow-led	multilateral	 institutions	 in	 the	region,	 fan	 the	 flames	of	
regional	 nationalisms,	 and	 even	 provoke	 interstate	 military	 conflicts	 over	 unresolved	 territorial	
disputes.	
(2)	The	spread	of	Islamic	radicalism	and	terrorism—from	Afghanistan	if	the	current	leadership	in	
Kabul	 falls,	 or	 based	 on	 Central	 Asian	 homegrown	 trends,	 facilitated	 by	 mounting	 social	 and	
economic	problems,	development	inequality,	high	corruption,	and	abuse	of	power	by	local	leaders.	













Past and Potential Future Russian Actions, Short of Armed Conflict 
After	a	very	active	period	between	2010	and	2015,	Russia	has	been	taking	less	decisive	actions	in	







with	 the	Mirziyoyev	 regime;	 it	 has	 also	been	 accelerating	military	 and	 security	 cooperation	with	
Kazakhstan,	 especially	 the	 project	 of	 a	 Unitary	 Regional	 Anti-Air	 Defense	 System.	 Additionally,	
Moscow	has	consolidated	its	stranglehold	over	Kyrgyzstan,	which	is	now	entirely	back	in	the	Russian	
orbit	after	years	of	being	the	most	pro-Western	country	in	the	region;	Russia	also	keeps	a	close	eye	
on	 Tajikistan.	 Despite	 this,	 Russia	 has	 failed	 to	 convince	 Kazakhstan	 to	 draw	 closer	 and	 accept	
supranational	institutions	inside	the	Eurasian	Economic	Union,	or	to	convince	Tajikistan	to	enter	the	
Eurasian	Economic	Union.	







Central	 Asia	 stands	 out	 as	 a	 comparatively	 “nontoxic”	 region	 where	 there	 are	 limited,	 but	 not	








still	 several	 domains	 where	 their	 respective	 soft	 powers	 complement	 each	 other:	 in	 the	 space	
industry,	civil	security,	 job-creation	mechanisms	and	rural	human	capital,	and	knowledge-sharing	



















































sides	 in	 the	Middle	East’s	many	 conflicts,	 and	he	 can	be	 expected	 to	 avoid	making	a	hard	 choice	
between	any	of	them	(including	between	Israel	and	Iran	in	Syria).	While	Moscow	and	Washington	
actually	 have	 some	 common	 interests	 in	 the	 Middle	 East	 (e.g.	 their	 mutual	 opposition	 to	 Sunni	
jihadists	such	as	the	Islamic	State	of	Iraq	and	the	Levant	(ISIL)	and	Al	Qaeda,	and	shared	support	of	
the	same	governments),	Russia	also	seeks	to	take	advantage	of	any	difference	between	the	US	and	
various	 actors	 in	 the	Middle	East	 to	 increase	Russian	 influence	with	 them.	Thus,	 despite	 sharing	
common	interests,	Russia	is	unlikely	to	collaborate	with	the	US	in	pursuit	of	them.	
Examining the Gray Zone—Russia & the Middle East 
Russian Interests and Objectives 
Russia	 has	 several	 interests	 in	 the	 Middle	 East.	 First	 and	 foremost,	 Moscow	 wants	 to	 prevent	
Chechnya	and	the	status	of	Muslims	in	Russia	generally	from	becoming	an	anti-Moscow	cause	célèbre	
in	 the	Muslim	world	 the	way	 that	Afghanistan	was	 in	 the	1980s.	Under	Putin,	 then,	Moscow	has	












particular.	 Russian	 petroleum	 firms	 have	 found	 investment	 opportunities	 in	 the	 Middle	 East;	
relatedly,	 several	 Gulf	 Arab	 states	 have	 invested	 large	 sums	 in	 the	 Russian	 petroleum	 industry.	









Afghanistan,	 Iraq,	 and	Libya,	 the	 successful	Russian	military	 intervention	 in	Syria	 since	2015	has	
served	to	burnish	Russia's	image	as	a	rising	great	power.	
In	addition,	Putin	sees	the	many	conflicts	in	the	Middle	East	as	opportunities	for	Russian	diplomacy	
to	 take	 charge	 of	 conflict	 resolution	 efforts,	 even	 if	 such	 efforts	 do	not	 actually	 come	 to	 fruition.	
Moscow	now	sees	 the	USSR’s	breaking	diplomatic	 relations	with	 Israel	 in	1967	as	having	been	a	
mistake.	This	cleared	the	way	for	the	US	to	work	with	all	sides	in	the	Arab-Israeli	dispute,	while	the	





Russia	 is	not	actively	 trying	 to	push	 the	US	out	of	 the	Middle	East	but	 sees	 the	many	differences	
between	the	US	on	the	one	hand	and	its	Middle	Eastern	allies	as	well	as	adversaries	on	the	other	as	
an	opportunity	 to	 increase	Russian	 influence	with	 them.	By	having	good	 relations	with	all	major	
actors	in	the	Middle	East	except	the	jihadists,	Moscow	also	wants	to	ensure	that	they	do	not	support	
any	American	effort	to	exclude	Russia	from	the	region.	









the	 Obama	 Administration	 undercutting	 America’s	 longstanding	 Egyptian	 ally,	 Hosni	 Mubarak,	
during	 the	 2011	 Arab	 Spring	 as	 well	 as	 the	 Trump	 Administration’s	 announcement	 that	 it	 is	
withdrawing	US	forces	from	Syria.	
Perhaps	 Putin’s	 greatest	 achievement	 in	 the	Middle	 East	 has	 been	 to	 create	 the	 impression	 that	
Russia	is	a	firm	supporter	of	the	region’s	largely	authoritarian	status	quo	governments	while	the	US,	














Attempted Russian Influence in the Middle East 
Putin	has	been	assiduously	courting	Middle	Eastern	leaders	in	his	own	special	way.	He	seems	much	
less	 concerned	 about	 being	 liked	 than	 in	 creating	 a	 situation	where	 it	 is	more	 advantageous	 for	
















Muslim	 world	 the	 way	 that	 Afghanistan	 was	 in	 the	 1980s.	 To	 this	 end,	 Russian	 propaganda	
emphasizes	 that	 Moscow	 supports	 certain	 Muslim	 causes	 that	 the	 US	 does	 not—especially	 the	
Palestinian	cause—even	though	Russia	(and	indeed,	several	Arab	governments)	closely	cooperate	
with	Israel.	





it	 as	an	enemy.	Even	a	 change	of	 leadership	 in	an	existing	government	could	 lead	 to	a	decline	 in	




















Imagining a Win-Win 
The	US	and	Russia	do	share	some	common	interests	in	the	Middle	East.	Unlike	the	Soviet	Union	which	












if	 they	do	not	cooperate	to	achieve	 it.	This	could	occur	through	the	general	weakening	of	 jihadist	
forces	in	the	Middle	East	and	elsewhere.	It	could	also	occur	through	the	Middle	Eastern	governments	
which	both	Moscow	and	Washington	support	continuing	to	seek	good	relations	with	both.	 Just	as	












cultural.	Their	outreach	 is	expanding.	Moreover,	Moscow’s	 success	 in	Syria	 is	helping	 to	 fuel	 this	
outreach	and	create	opportunities	Moscow	likely	hadn’t	planned	on	prior	to	the	intervention.	Most	
importantly,	Western	inaction	made	it	easy	for	Putin	to	step	in	and	assert	himself.	Political	objectives	
matter	 to	 the	 Kremlin	 in	 a	 zero-sum	worldview:	 for	 Russia	 to	 win,	 the	 US	 has	 to	 lose.	 Political	
priorities	 for	 Moscow	 are	 creating	 a	 perception	 of	 Russia	 as	 a	 great	 power,	 a	 key	 regional	














North Africa  
The	 Arab	 Spring	 originated	 in	 Tunisia.	 Moscow	 saw	 these	 events	 as	 a	 continuation	 of	 what	 it	
perceived	as	US-sponsored	regime	change,	which	had	to	be	checked	lest	it	one	day	oust	Putin	himself.	
Putin	doesn’t	believe	it’s	possible	for	people	to	rise	up	against	their	ruler	on	their	own.		





















critical	 Russian	 objective.	 Putin	 seeks	 to	 establish	 himself	 in	 a	 peacemaker	 role,	 and	 in	 so	 doing	
presents	himself	as	a	more	reliable	actor	who	can	not	only	talk	to	everyone	but	also	will	do	what	he	





energy	 program	 (Davidson,	 2018;	 “Russia	 and	Morocco	 sign	 aggreements”,	 2017;	 “Morocco	 and	
Russia	 to	 Sign	Nuclear	Deal”,	 2018).	 Sudan’s	 energy	 resources	 are	 also	 important	 to	 the	Kremlin	
(“The	return	of	Russia	to	Africa”,	2018).	
















Suez	 Canal.	 Oleg	 Ozerov,	 Russian	 Foreign	 Affairs	 ministry’s	 deputy	 director	 for	 Africa	 and	
ambassador	to	Saudi	Arabia	noted	recently	that	African	countries	requested	Russian	assistance	after	
observing	 Russia’s	 “success	 in	 counterterrorism	 operations	 in	 Syria”	 (Valdai	 Club,	 2018).	 When	









important,	 but	 doesn’t	 take	 away	 from	 the	 broader	 point	 of	 Putin	 working	 to	 leverage	 corrupt,	
authoritarian	African	leaders,	if	not	war	criminals,	to	achieve	his	own	aims.		
Just	 as	 in	 the	Middle	 East,	 in	 Africa,	Moscow	 seeks	 a	 powerbroker	 role	 and	 to	 sideline	Western	
influence,	while	the	region’s	autocratic	rulers	welcome	a	fellow	authoritarian’s	support.	In	addition,	
the	anti-Western	undercurrent	in	Russia’s	outreach	to	Africa	seems	to	have	a	receptive	audience	in	
the	region	beyond	autocratic	 rules.	Russia	was	never	a	colonial	power	 in	Africa,	and	 the	region’s	
perceptions	of	Russia	in	terms	of	racism	and	prejudice	issues	(including	its	Soviet	predecessor)	likely	





Russian Actions, Short of Armed Conflict, in Africa 
Overall Regional Steps: Diplomacy, Business, Military, Political 
Overall,	Moscow	has	built	relations	with	all	major	relevant	actors	in	North	Africa,	and	is	increasingly	
applying	 the	 same	model	 to	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 continent.	Moscow	went	 on	 a	 broad	 charm	offensive	
hosting	multiple	diplomatic	exchanges	with	representatives	from	many	African	countries	in	recent	
years.	Senior	Russian	officials	such	as	Minister	of	Foreign	Affairs	Sergey	Lavrov	increasingly	tour	the	






Republic	 (CAR)	 (Seddon	 &	 Wilson,	 2018).	 Reportedly,	 Moscow	 has	 donated	 weapons	 and	 sent	







































On	 the	 economic	 front,	 Russian	 tourists	 are	 poised	 to	 return	 to	 Egypt	 in	 the	 near	 future.	 Their	
contribution	 is	hugely	 important	 to	Egypt.	Egypt	had	emerged	as	 the	 top	destination	 for	Russian	
tourists	in	recent	years.	For	example,	approximately	3	million	of	Russian	tourists	(out	of	a	total	of	10	
million	a	year)	have	travelled	to	Egypt	annually	in	2014	for	example,	until	the	ban	on	Russian	tourism	
to	 the	 country	 following	 the	 October	 2015	 terrorist	 attack	 that	 resulted	 in	 the	 death	 of	 all	 224	
passengers	on	board	the	Metrojet	that	crashed	over	the	Sinai	as	the	result	of	the	attack.	Putin	lifted	
the	 travel	 ban	 last	 year.	 (“Resuming	 Russian	 tourism”,	 2018;	 Borshchevskaya,	 2015).	 The	 two	
countries	 also	 created	 a	 free-trade	 zone.	 In	 recent	 years,	 overall	 bilateral	 trade	 has	 grown	 to	
approximately	 $6.5	 billion	 a	 year	 according	 to	 official	 government	 sources	 (“Russia	 and	 Egypt”,	
2018).	
In	Libya,	Moscow	has	provided	assistance	in	several	ways,	including	printing	money	that	reportedly	
was	 transferred	 to	 a	 branch	 loyal	 to	Khalifa	Haftar,	 as	well	 as	 airlifting	many	 dozens	 of	Haftar’s	
wounded	 soldiers	 and	 flying	 them	 to	Moscow	 for	 treatment.	 Haftar	 himself	 has	 visited	Moscow	
several	times.	In	addition	to	the	relationship	with	Haftar,	Moscow	has	built	ties	with	all	major	factions		
in	Libya—Hafter,	pro-Qaddafi	factions,	and	the	UN-recognized	government	of	Serraj	(“Russia	makes	


















with	 both	 perceived	 Obama	 and	 Trump	 administration	 sympathy	 toward	 the	 Polisario	 Front’s	
position	with	regard	both	to	a	human	rights	monitoring	component	to	MINURSO’s	mission	as	well	as	
lack	of	enthusiasm	 for	Morocco’s	position	on	 the	Western	Sahara.	That	 the	Polisario	Front	was	a	
Soviet	Cold	War	proxy	is	an	ironic,	but	not	insurmountable	obstacle	in	Moscow’s	outreach	to	Rabat. 


















appears	 to	be	a	prime	candidate	 for	Moscow	to	play	a	 larger	powerbroker	role	(Borshchevskaya,	
2017).	Another	potential	set	of	actions	are	more	energy,	arms,	and	natural	resource	deals	with	Russia	
across	 the	 region,	 along	 with	 Moscow’s	 continued	 attempts	 to	 gain	 berthing	 rights	 on	 the	
Mediterranean.	Third,	efforts	to	rehabilitate	Syria’s	Assad	are	likely	to	continue.		
















































































































and	 refined	 in	 Ukraine	 and	 Syria,	 will	 almost	 certainly	 remain	 an	 essential	 part	 of	 the	 Russian	
operational	‘toolbox’	in	the	future.	This	interventionist	model	could	gain	in	momentum	across	Africa	
by	the	potential	withdrawal	of	US	troops	on	the	continent.	
Russian Gray Zone Activites—Africa 
Russian Interests and Objectives 
The	political	 leadership	 in	Russia	has	 for	many	years	held	a	pessimistic,	bordering	on	dystopian,	
outlook	 on	 the	 future	 in	 two	 overlapping	 areas.	 Firstly,	 with	 an	 oil-dependent	 economy	 under	
increasing	pressure	from	greater	global	use	of	renewables, a	population	projected	to	shrink	by	the	
millions,	and	a	 fragile	state	system	for	welfare	provision,	Russia	 is	under	great	 internal	pressure.	
Corruption	and	nepotism	at	all	levels	undermine	efforts	at	reform	and	change.		
Secondly,	there	is	broad	consensus	across	the	Russian	policy	community	that	international	affairs	
have	 entered	 a	 time	 of	 considerable	 competition	 across	 multiple	 domains:	 over	 resources,	
technological	 dominance,	 cultural	 values,	 influence,	 and	 access	 to	markets.	 Russian	 officials	 and	
analysts	often	emphasize	their	view	that	a	major	transition	away	from	the	West	is	underway	in	the	
international	architecture,	resulting	in	chaos	and	possibly	war	through	the	2020s	(Monaghan,	2017).	
From	a	Russian	point	of	view,	 the	country	 is	 currently	engaged	 in	a	multi-facetted,	multi-domain	
conflict	with	the	West,	in	which	the	US	and	its	allies	have	been	using	its	comprehensive	power	options	
to	 undermine,	 weaken,	 and	 marginalize	 Russia.	 Moscow	 views	 itself	 as	 being	 besieged	 and	
constrained	 by	 the	 West’s	 policies,	 which	 they	 view	 as	 a	 continuation	 of	 classical	 containment	
strategy.	 Since	 Putin	 came	 to	 power,	 the	 Russian	 objective	 has	 been	 to	 break	 this	 ‘siege’	 and	
















Private military companies 
Another	of	Moscow’s	tried	and	tested	approaches,	which	has	been	refined	since	the	Georgian	War	in	
2008,	 has	 been	 to	 employ	 coordinated,	 ‘low	 intensity’	 and	 bespoke	 packages	 wherever	 an	
opportunity	or	power	vacuum	emerges.	These	packages	often	include	private	military	contractors	
(PMCs),	special	forces,	and	military	specialists	(technical	specialists,	C-2,	electronic	warfare,	drones,	
signals,	 ISR,	 etc.).	 Together,	 these	 components	 represent	 an	 increasingly	 flexible	 instrument	 for	
refined	expeditionary	warfare.	
Although	still	 formally	 illegal	 in	Russia,	 the	use	of	PMCs	and	mercenaries	has	allowed	Moscow	to	
manage	 public	 opinion,	 by	 way	 of	 offering	 a	 degree	 of	 separation	 from	 the	 Russian	 state.	 This	
approach	 has	 been	 evident	 in	 Eastern	 Ukraine,	 Syria,	 and	 Sudan—theatres	 in	 which	 Russia’s	
involvement	has	been	deliberately	ambiguous.	PMCs	also	offer	an	opportunity	to	confuse	Russia’s	
rivals	 and	muddy	 the	waters	 concerning	 the	 identity	 and	 objectives	 of	 the	 forces,	 exploiting	 the	
wilderness	of	mirrors	that	disinformation	reinforces.	
Russia,	it	appears,	has	observed	how	the	West	has	utilized	mercenaries	and	military	contractors	in	








of	 streamlining	 its	 expeditionary	 capabilities	 while	 advancing	 Russian	 geo-economic	 interests,	
without	requiring	major	involvement	of	the	state	and	its	resources.	




Sudan.	 Many	 of	 these	 countries’	 leaders	 have	 attended	 Russian	 institutions,	 such	 as	 the	 Patrice	
Lumumba	 University	 in	 Moscow,	 or	 the	 Frunze	 military	 academy.	 These	 relationships	 are	 now	











important	 food	supplier	 to	Russian	markets,	 especially	after	Russia	banned	 the	 import	of	 certain	
Western	food	products.	
Moreover,	African	countries	have	become	an	increasingly	important	source	of	diplomatic	support,	in	
venues	such	as	 the	United	Nations.	 In	addition,	 in	 the	 face	of	 continued	Western	sanctions	and	a	
stagnant	economy,	arms	exports	are	perceived	as	an	increasingly	lucrative	area	for	Russian	economic	
growth,	in	selling	both	surplus	stockpiled	Cold	War	era	equipment	as	well	as	newer	equipment	to	
provide	 hard	 currency	 revenues	 to	 finance	 its	 military	 industrial	 sector	 and	 research	 and	













appears	 to	 include	 an	 element	 of	 gaining	 access	 to	 the	 host	 nation’s	 decision-making	 circles	 and	
creating	new	malleable	networks.	For	example,	CAR’s	President	has	agreed	to	the	appointment	of	a	
Russian	 citizen,	 Valeriy	 Zakharov,	 as	 his	 national	 security	 advisor.	 A	 similar	 approach	 has	 been	
adopted	 in	 Sudan,	 where	 Moscow	 has	 managed	 to	 establish	 permanent	 representation	 in	 the	
country’s	Ministry	of	Defence	(Hedenskog,	2019).	
In	 January	 2019,	 the	 CAR’s	Minister	 of	 Defence	 announced	 that	 the	 country	would	welcome	 the	
opening	 of	 a	 Russian	military	 base	 on	 its	 territory.	 This	 declaration	 has	 been	 interpreted	 as	 an	
indicator	that	Moscow	is	seeking	to	gain	footholds	in	Africa	for	purposes	beyond	resource	acquisition	
and	military	equipment	sales.	If	such	a	base	were	to	open,	analysts	have	speculated	that	the	former	
French	 colony,	 strategically	 situated	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 continent,	 could	 become	 Russia’s	 new	










Russian	officials	have	hinted	 that	a	Russian	military	base	 in	 the	CAR	could	become	an	 important	







extensive	 and	 entrenched	 in	 Russian	 policy	 in	 the	 coming	 years,	 and	 that	 we	 will	 see	 more	
widespread	employment	of	strategically	 flexible	and	operationally	adaptable	 forces	across	Africa.	
This	development	may	be	exacerbated	by	the	diminished	status	of	AFRICOM	within	US	and	Western	
















































































politics	 of	 the	 region,	 largely	 from	 the	 (now	 aging)	 cold-war	 era	 intelligence	 specialists	 and	









conflict	with	 the	US.	Russia’s	 fledging	efforts	 to	coordinate	with	China	 in	Latin	America	on	select	
issues,	such	as	the	crisis	in	Venezuela,	magnifies	the	strategic	threat	that	its	activities	present	to	US	
interests.	
Russian Interests and Objectives in Latin America 









and	 Cuba,	 to	 maintain	 a	 political	 and	military	 position	 that	 demonstrates	 Russia’s	 global	 reach,	
sending	a	warning	to	the	US	that	Russia	could	threaten	the	US	in	its	“backyard”	if	the	US	continues	to	
pressure	Russia	and	interfere	in	Russia’s	“near	abroad.”	Separately,	through	helping	to	prop	up	rogue	
















the	 region	 critical	 to	 its	 national	 interests,	 or	 a	 key	 vehicle	 in	 a	 broader	 plan	 for	 securing	 other	
national	objectives	(such	a	strengthening	 its	strategic	position	 in	specific	parts	of	Latin	America).	
(Ellis,	2015).	
Recent Russian Activities in Latin America 
Russian	 activities	 in	 Latin	America	may	 be	 divided	 into	 (1)	 political-military	 initiatives	with	 key	
partners	but	which	also	have	an	economic	component,	(2)	more	purely	economic	activities	in	search	




considerably,	 due	 largely	 to	 a	 political	 shift	 to	 the	 right	 across	 the	 region.	 That	 shift	 has	 been	
deepened	 and	 sustained,	 ironically,	 through	 the	 negative	 political	 and	 economic	 example	 of	 the	
populist-socialist	Maduro	regime	in	Venezuela	(which	Russia	helped	to	sustain	in	power).	Outside	of	
Venezuela,	 such	 changes	 include	 the	 replacement	 the	 pro-Russian	 Peronist	 regime	 of	 Christina	
Fernandez	de	Kirchner	by	the	pro-market	government	of	Mauricio	Macri	in	Argentina’s	October	2015	





similarly	slowed	Russian	advances	and	set	 the	stage	 for	an	 investigation	of	corruption	associated	
with	the	purchase	of	Russian	helicopters	by	the	preceding	administration	of	Ollanta	Humala.	In	Chile,	
in	December	2017,	 elections	 removed	 the	 center-left	Concertación	 coalition	 from	 the	presidency,	




Abdo	 Benitez	 in	 April	 2018,	 and	 in	 Brazil,	 by	 Jair	 Bolsonaro	 in	 October	 2018,	 foreclosed	 ties	












fighter	 aircraft,	 Mi-35	 attack	 helicopters,	Mi-17	 transport	 helicopters,	 T-72	 tanks,	 BMP	 and	 BTR	



































other	 vehicles	 to	 Cuba,	 and	 explored	 renovating	 the	 Cienfuegos	 refinery	 (and	 possibly	 even	
completing	Cuba’s	cold	war-era	Juragua	nuclear	power	plant).	Nonetheless,	despite	proclamations	of	




intelligence	 facilities	 in	Lourdes,	Bejucal,	 or	 Santiago	de	Cuba	 (for	monitoring	 the	US),	 nor	has	 it	
bought	significant	quantities	of	Russian	military	equipment	or	participated	 in	all	of	 the	occasions	
since	2008	in	which	Russia	has	deployed	military	assets	to	the	region.	Cuba	has,	however,	permitted	
some	 visits	 by	 Russian	warships	 (including	 the	 docking	 of	 the	 signals	 collection	 ship	 Leonov	 in	





equipment	 and	 support	packages,	 although	 in	 at	 least	one	 case	 (regarding	 replacement	of	Peru’s	
aging	BM-21	self-propelled	rocket	launchers),	Russia	lost	out	to	a	Chinese	competitor	selling	its	Type	
90B	system.	Russia	has	also	signed	a	military	cooperation	agreement	with	Suriname.		
With	 respect	 to	 extractive	 sectors,	 Russian	 oil	 companies	 are	 doing	 work	 in	 Ecuador	 Bolivia,	
Venezuela,	 and	Cuba,	 among	other	 countries,	while	Rusal,	 as	noted	previously,	 has	 a	presence	 in	


















In	 Venezuela,	 US-led	 military	 intervention	 (including	 a	 multi-national	 force	 responding	 to	 a	
breakdown	of	order),	could	lead	Russia	to	opportunistically	join	Cuba	in	supporting	elements	of	the	


















In	Mexico,	 frustration	by	 the	 leftist	AMLO	government	 over	US	 rhetoric	 and	policies	 regarding	 a	
border	wall,	migrants	and	US	failure	to	ratify	the	new	USMCA	trade	deal	could	lead	AMLO	to	more	
fully	embrace	both	China	and	Russia	as	counterweights	to	the	US.	While	Russia	has	little	to	sell,	loan	
to,	 or	 invest	 in	 Mexico,	 it	 could	 engage	 in	 expanded	 symbolic	 defense	 interactions	 such	 as	
institutional	 visits,	 officer	 training	 in	 Russia,	 Russian	 training	 in	Mexico,	 or	 joint	 exercises.	With	
respect	to	arms	sales,	AMLO’s	cancellation	of	purchases	of	US	Blackhawk	helicopters	could	open	the	
door	for	it	to	do	more	work	with	the	Russians	in	upgrading	its	Mi-17s.	
Perceived Russian Threats to its Interests in Latin America 




Russian Efforts to Influence Key Actors in the Region 
In	contrast	to	China,	which	uses	access	to	its	markets	and	the	possibility	of	loans	and	investment	as	
tools	 of	 soft	 power,	 Russian	 ability	 to	 exert	 influence	 through	 economic	 resources,	 either	 by	
providing	aid	or	denying	commercial	transactions,	is	minimal.	Even	among	its	friends,	Russia’s	ability	





Russian Efforts to Influence Civilian Populations in the Region 






democratic	 processes,	 and	Western	 values	 therein.	 As	 a	 compliment,	 Russia	may	 be	 using	 social	
media	to	plant	“fake	news”	or	magnify	stories	that	support	its	strategic	communication	objectives,	





































Russia	 has	 important	 socio-economic	 and	 security	 interests	 in	 the	 Arctic.	 This	 paper	 analyzes	





Russian Interests and Objectives in the Arctic 
The	 Russian	 Federation’s	 strategy	 in	 the	 Arctic	 is	 a	 contested	 topic	 in	 academia,	 media,	 and	
policymaking.	Russia	is	often	portrayed	as	the	foremost	instigator	of	conflict	in	the	region.	It	is	true	
that	the	Russian	government	has	declared	that	all	activity	in	the	Arctic	should	be	tied	to	the	interests	
















Perhaps	 the	 greatest	 example	 of	 circumpolar	 cooperation	 is	 the	 Arctic	 Council	 (AC),	 an	
intergovernmental	 forum	that	acts	by	consensus	between	the	eight	Arctic	states	–	 the	US,	Russia,	
Canada,	Sweden,	Norway,	Finland,	Denmark,	and	Iceland.	Although	the	AC	does	not	discuss	military	









cultural	 importance	to	Russia	 for	centuries.	The	mythical	status	of	 the	Arctic	has	been	significant	
throughout	Russian	history.	The	northward	expansions	of	Ivan	the	Terrible	and	Peter	the	Great	were	
fundamental	 to	 the	 growth	 of	 the	 Russian	 Empire.	 The	 faraway	 northern	 regions	were	 also	 the	
settings	for	the	brutal	gulag	camps	under	Stalin.	
State Development Policy 
Russia’s	 official	 Arctic	 strategy	 and	 interests	 are	 best	 understood	 by	 examining	 the	 government	
publications	 put	 forward	 by	 the	 various	 bodies	 of	 the	 Russian	 state.	 In	 September	 2008,	 the	
Foundations	of	the	State	Policy	of	the	Russian	Federation	in	the	Arctic	for	the	Period	Until	2020	and	
Beyond	 was	 adopted	 by	 then	 President	 Dmitry	 Medvedev.	 The	 document	 presents	 the	 Russian	










Russia’s	 interests	 in	 the	 Arctic	 are	 evidently	 complex	 but	 generally	 oriented	 towards	 internal	
economic	and	social	development,	along	with	international	cooperation	through	existing	legal	and	
multilateral	 regimes.	 In	 2013,	 President	 Putin	 approved	 the	Development	 Strategy	 of	 the	 Russian	
Arctic	and	the	Provision	of	National	Security	for	the	Period	Until	2020.	The	strategy,	a	revision	of	the	
2008	document,	provides	a	more	comprehensive	description	of	Russia’s	objectives,	priorities,	and	
means	 of	 implementation.	 The	 document	mentions	 economic	 and	 environmental	 priorities	more	
often	than	it	discusses	defense	aims.	Further	objectives	include	“developing	the	Russian	icebreaker	
fleet,	modernizing	 the	air	 service	and	airport	network,	 and	establishing	modern	 information	and	
telecommunication	 infrastructure”	 (President	 of	 the	 Russian	 Federation,	 2013).	 Throughout	 the	
strategy	document,	these	measures	are	tied	to	economic	interests.	For	example,	surveillance	of	the	


























Federation	 declares	 that	 armed	 forces	 must	 be	 present	 in	 the	 Russian	 Arctic	 to	 secure	 national	
interests	even	during	peacetime.	However,	the	document	calls	for	a	general	military	renovation	to	
replace	old	icebreakers	and	other	decrepit	units.		
Energy and Natural Resource Interests 
The	2013	Development	Policy	highlights	Russia’s	interest	in	expanding	large-scale	economic	projects	
involving	 energy	 extraction.	 One	 of	 Russia’s	 main	 priorities	 is	 to	 satisfy	 Russia’s	 need	 for	




(EEZ)	 in	 the	 Arctic	 (Claes	 &	Moe,	 2014).	 As	much	 as	 twenty	 percent	 of	 Russia’s	 gross	 domestic	
product	 (GDP)	 is	generated	within	Russian	 territories	 in	 the	Arctic	 (Laruelle,	2014).	Accordingly,	




“geological	 exploration,	 private	 investments,	 and	 state	 participation	 in	 the	 development	 of	 new	
territories	and	waters.”	This	document	also	proclaims	the	Russian	state’s	hopes	to	enhance	Russian	
energy	 companies’	 positions	 abroad	 and	 provide	 an	 environment	 for	 efficient	 international	
cooperation	for	sophisticated	energy	projects	in	the	Arctic.		
Maritime Shipping Interests 
The	fading	sea	ice	in	the	Arctic	has	led	analysts	and	policymakers	to	herald	the	development	of	a	new	







develop	 the	NSR	 by	 commissioning	 nuclear	 icebreakers,	 improving	 the	 ports	 along	 the	 lane	 and	
creating	a	monitoring	system.	Furthermore,	it	is	a	high	priority	for	Russia	to	build	an	effective	border	
control	service	to	monitor	the	route	and	enforce	regulations.	
Moscow	 also	 has	 a	 partial	 interest	 in	 internationalizing	 access	 to	 the	NSR,	 but	 is	 so	 far	 oriented	










Recent Russian Actions, Short of Armed Conflict, in the Arctic 
Russia’s	actions	in	the	Arctic	demonstrate	a	commitment	to	realizing	their	economic,	security,	and	
developmental	objectives.	Russia	has	partially	focused	on	offshore	drilling,	mineral	extraction	and	








Russia’s	 security	 actions	 in	 the	 Arctic	 reflect	 a	 commitment	 to	 upholding	 national	 sovereignty,	
securing	 ongoing	 economic	 interests,	 and	 asserting	 Russia	 as	 a	 first-class	military	 power	 in	 the	
twenty-first	century.	Since	the	2007	polar	expedition	when	Russian	scientists	planted	their	flag	on	
the	North	Pole’s	seabed,	many	Western	journalists	and	politicians	have	cast	Russian	actions	in	the	
Arctic	 as	 expansionist,	 aggressive	 and	 threatening.	Popular	perceptions	of	Russia’s	Arctic	 actions	
have	also	turned	negative	after	the	Ukrainian	Crisis.	
It	was	expected	in	the	wake	of	the	crisis	that	the	Kremlin	would	ramp	up	and	accelerate	its	military	



























































era,	 the	coal,	minerals,	 and	oil	of	 the	Far	North	played	key	 roles	 in	 the	nation’s	 industrialization.	
Currently,	 there	 are	 a	 number	 of	 hydrocarbon	 companies	 operating	 in	 the	 Arctic.	 Sanctions	 on	





to	 invest	 in	 infrastructure	 and	 resource	development.	 For	 the	period	until	 2024,	 the	 sum	of	 $83	
million	will	cover	investments	in	railways,	sea	ports,	and	hydrocarbon	and	coal	fields.	This	sum	is	
comparable	 to	 what	 the	 Russian	 government	 invests	 in	 healthcare	 and	 education	 combined	
(Staalesen,	2018).	Offshore	commercial	production	is	only	underway	at	the	Prirazlomnoye	field.	This	







China	National	 Petroleum	Corporation,	 and	 the	 Chinese	 Silk	 Road	 Fund.	 Largely	 due	 to	Western	
sanctions	and	Russian	countersanctions,	Russia	has	pivoted	eastwards	and	 fostered	relationships	
with	 Asian	 countries,	 especially	 China.	 As	 a	 heavily	 industrialized	 country,	 China	 has	 a	 growing	
interest	in	securing	their	energy	supply,	and	is	looking	to	the	Arctic	for	hydrocarbons	and	minerals.	
Yamal	LNG	is	pivotal	to	the	maritime	economy	of	the	Arctic	as	it	is	one	of	the	major	sources	of	cargo	





















Greenpeace	 has	 nicknamed	 it	 “floating	 Chernobyl”	 (Wootson,	 2018).	 Russian	 ambitions	 for	 the	
maritime	economy	are	ambitious	and	it	shows	in	the	breadth	of	collaborations	and	investments.		
To	conclude,	Russian	interests	and	activities	in	the	Arctic	are	generally	oriented	towards	achieving	
domestic	 economic	 and	 social	 development.	 Russia’s	 major	 economic	 ambitions	 involve	 energy	
extraction	 and	 maritime	 shipping.	 Considering	 these	 projects’	 economic	 significance	 and	 the	
























































































PART IV. HOW SHOULD THE US COUNTERACT RUSSIAN GRAY ZONE 
ACTIVITIES ACROSS THE GLOBE? 







European	and	Middle	Eastern	security	and	economic	organizations	 in	 its	 favor	 (National	Defense	
Strategy	 summary,	 p.	 2).	 Countering	 Russian	 provocations	 requires	 all	 instruments	 of	 national	
power.	 The	NDS	 recognizes	 that	 simple	 fact	 and	 points	 out	 that	 successful	 competition	 requires	
integrating	multiple	elements	of	national	power	(Mattis,	2018	p.	4).	The	NDS	states,	“in	competition	






democratic	 institutions.	 To	 counter	 Russian	military	 proxies,	 the	 United	 States	 can	 increase	 the	
capabilities	 of	 allies	 and	 partners.	 Meanwhile,	 Russian	 threats	 to	 use	 force	 can	 be	 mitigated	 by	
demonstrating	US	resolve	and	capability	to	deter	and	defeat	Russian	aggression.	If	the	US	redlines	
are	clearly	communicated,	and	backed	up	by	credible	force,	escalation	can	be	avoided.	The	specific	
Russian	 redlines	 are	 not	 as	 critical	 for	 the	 Competitive	 Zone	 actions,	 because	 due	 to	 its	 nature	
Competitive	Zone	provocative	activities	taken	by	Russia	are	designed	to	stay	away	from	open	conflict.	
At	the	same	time,	the	United	States	needs	to	groom	a	new	generation	of	Russia	experts	who	not	only	
understand	 Russian	 actions	 in	 the	 current	 context,	 but	 that	 have	 a	 cultural	 and	 historical	
understanding	of	Russia	on	which	to	base	their	recommendations	for	future	US	actions.	The	United	
States	remains	the	world’s	most	powerful	nation,	with	the	largest	GDP	and	most	powerful	military.	
It	 has	 tremendous	 resources	 available	 through	all	 the	 instruments	of	national	power	 to	 confront	
provocative	Russian	actions.		
Introduction 
The	 return	 of	 the	 Great	 Power	 competition,	 as	 articulated	 in	 the	 latest	 strategic	 guidance,	 is	
reinvigorating	the	US	government’s	efforts	towards	a	more	competitive	approach	towards	China	and	
Russia.	This	paper	addresses,	from	a	global	perspective,	the	question	of	what	potential	actions	the	
United	 States	 could	 employ	 proactively	 or	 in	 response	 to	 Russian	 provocative	 activities	 in	 the	
Competitive	Zone.	The	National	Defense	Strategy	(NDS)	lays	out	the	priority	of	effort	to	address	the	








Potential Actions to Counter Russian Activities 
As	articulated	in	the	NDS,	Russia	is	focusing	its	efforts	in	two	geographic	areas,	Europe	and	the	Middle	
East.	While	the	Unites	States	cannot	be	everywhere,	it	can	focus	its	actions	to	address	both	regions.	















partner	 capabilities	 to	 expose,	 attribute,	 and	 reduce	 corruption.	 As	 listed	 in	 the	 Corruption	
Perceptions	 Index—with	 minor	 exceptions—the	 least	 corrupt	 countries	 in	 the	 world	 are	
democracies	 (Corruption	Perception	 Index,	 2018).	 Therefore,	 it	 naturally	 follows	 that	 the	United	
States	should	focus	its	instruments	of	power	on	strengthening	democratic	governance	in	allied	and	





fallout.	 The	 same	 goes	 for	 the	 rest	 of	 the	world.	 Democratic	 systems	 of	 governance	 present	 the	
biggest	challenge	to	Russian	and	Chinese	use	of	corrupt	practices.	
Another	way	Russia	presents	a	 challenge	 is	 in	 the	unique	way	uses	 its	 state-owned	hydrocarbon	
companies	to	pursue	political	objectives.	In	Europe,	the	threat	to	our	allies	is	their	dependence	or	
Russian	oil	and	gas.	That	dependence	can	be	proactively	managed	by	encouraging	diversification	of	
energy	 sources	 and	 investments	 in	 alternative	 energy	 sources.	 In	 the	Middle	East,	Russia	has	no	
similar	economic	leverage	against	US	partners.		
In	 the	 information	 realm,	 Russian	 propaganda	 is	 an	 age-old	 problem.	 While	 the	 methods	 of	
propaganda	Russia	uses	have	changed	from	Soviet	times,	the	problem	is	similar	to	the	one	the	United	
States	faced	during	the	Cold	War.	As	during	the	Cold	War,	the	most	effective	antidote	to	propaganda	











can	be	 taken.	Proactively,	 the	United	States	can	 increase	 the	capabilities	of	allies	and	partners	 to	
combat	Russian	proxies	through	training	and	equipment	as	being	done	now	in	Ukraine.	Meanwhile,	







































military.	 It	 has	 tremendous	 resources	 available	 through	 all	 the	 instruments	 of	 national	 power	 to	






























Promoting Liberalism in Europe 














need	 to	 encourage	 political	 and	 economic	 liberalization	 among	 the	 population,	 and	 then	 let	 the	
populace	do	the	societal	changing.		
If	there	is	one	moral	the	US	ought	to	be	pushing,	it	is	transparency.	Transparency	is	a	key	component	
of	 any	 functioning	 liberal	 political	 or	 economic	 system,	 and	 yet	 that	 is	 exactly	what	many	of	 the	
countries	in	Eastern	Europe	lack.	Specifically,	transparency	in	Ukraine	would	significantly	improve	
the	chances	of	enduring	democratization	and	marketization.		







is	 not	 realistic	 (in	 large	 part	 because	 of	 expansion	 fatigue	 within	 the	 EU).	 Still,	 the	 EU	 can	 be	
APPROVED	FOR	PUBLIC	RELEASE	
Lamoreaux	 APPROVED	FOR	PUBLIC	RELEASE	 96	
encouraged	 to	 do	 more.	 Promoting	 transparency	 alongside	 liberalization	 will	 lend	 credibility	 to	




(as	we	 need	 significant	 societal	 healing	within	 our	 own	 country),	 but	 societal	 healing,	 especially	
within	the	Baltic	States,	would	do	much	to	limit	Russia’s	influence	there.	Many	states	across	Eastern	
Europe	suffer	from	tensions	between	different	ethnic/religious/linguistic	groups.	The	Baltic	States,	




the	 Russian	 minorities	 while	 still	 being	 assured	 of	Western	 institutional	 support.	 Specifically,	 if	
Russians	 were	 finally	 afforded	 equal	 rights,	 the	 ethno-linguistic	 Russian	 population	 would	 have	





We	 could	 positively	 impact	 the	 situation	 by	 signaling	 our	 support	 for	 the	 Baltic	 States	 through	
continued	NATO	presence	there	while	publicly	encouraging	societal	reconciliation	between	ethnic	
Balts	and	ethnic	Russians,	and	publicly	discouraging	“Russian-bashing”	by	Baltic	elites.	Send	a	signal	
that	we	are	happy	 to	 support	 them	within	Western	 frameworks	but	expect	 them	 to	 refrain	 from	
provoking	negative/aggressive	behavior	from	Russia.		
Strategic Implications of US Actions and Objectives 
We	need	a	politically	and	economically	liberal	Europe.	We	need	the	Baltic	States	within	that	liberal	
Europe.	But,	we	need	the	Baltic	States	to	be	something	of	a	“Finland”:	conciliatory	and	cooperative	
toward	Russia	 (even	while	wary)	 instead	of	provocative.	 If	 the	Baltic	 States	 continue	 to	provoke	

















risk	 escalating	 tensions	 with	 Russia;	 draw	 them	 down,	 and	 we	 risk	 angering	 the	 Baltic	 States,	











public	humiliation	associated	with	 a	war	of	words.	As	Russia	 is	 already	 somewhat	backed	 into	 a	
corner	economically	and	diplomatically,	already	trying	to	cope	with	international	humiliation	for	the	
general	 opposition	 to	 their	 blundering	 war	 with	 Ukraine,	 any	 progression	 in	 relations	 between	
Russia	and	the	West	could	start	with	something	of	an	olive	branch	from	the	Baltic	States.		
Russian “Red Lines” 






Ukraine,	 but	 the	 likelihood	 of	 that	 happening	 seems	 very	 remote.	 The	 likelihood	 of	 NATO	
membership	ever	being	offered	to	Belarus	seems	entirely	unlikely.	Regardless,	the	prospect	of	NATO	





Crimea)	 have	 left	many	 in	 Finland	more	 openly	 considering	NATO	membership.	 The	Kremlin,	 in	
return,	has	stated	 that	Finnish	NATO	membership	would	provoke	some	response.	Georgia	 is	 in	a	
situation	similar	to	Ukraine:	they’ve	been	offered	(rather	tentatively)	NATO	membership,	but	it	looks	
unlikey	that	they	will	accede	to	membership	any	time	soon.	However,	the	prospect	of	NATO	having	





Potential Negative Outcomes & Worst-Case Scenarios 




















while	 also	 promoting	 societal	 change.	 Specifically,	 the	 Baltic	 States	 need	 to	 be	 much	 more	























Geopolitics in Central Asia 
Among	the	sub-regions	of	the	world,	the	area	of	Central	Asia	is	one	of	the	more	difficult	to	outline	
clear	 actions	 for	 the	US,	 simply	because	of	 the	 advantages	 that	other	 larger	powers	have,	 due	 to	




1991,	 that	 is,	 from	the	national	delimitation	of	1924	to	the	collapse	of	 the	country	 in	1991,	 these	




five	 states	 have	 connections	with	Russia	 that	 are	 historic,	 institutional,	 and	 existential.	 Although	
China	has	become	the	key	economic	actor	in	the	region,	Russia	remains	critical	in	other	areas.	It	is	




the	presence	of	Russia	 in	 the	region	and	 its	 importance.	Over	 time,	 the	 level	of	connectivity	with	
Russia	has	become	more	complex;	Uzbekistan	and	Turkmenistan	are	perhaps	the	least	“dependent”	
on	Russia,	while	Kyrgyzstan	and	Tajikistan	 rely	heavily	on	Russian	 investment,	 opportunities	 for	





Examining & Defining Russian Competitive Activities  
Within	this	environment,	what	would	be	categorized	as	competitive	Russian	activities?	One	could	
look	 at	 increased	 pressure	 to	 host	 Russian	 troops	 in	 a	 given	 country	 or	 expanding	 the	 remit	 of	
existing	units	therein	(Tajikistan	and	Kyrgyzstan).	Economically,	it	could	be	pressure	to	adhere	to	





more	aggressive	along	 the	Kazakhstani	border,	 it	 is	unlikely	 that	 it	would	resort	 to	actual	kinetic	
operations	 (invasion)	 in	 the	 immediate	 future.	 Baring	 a	 radical	 shift	 in	Kazakhstan’s	 foreign	 and	









Conditions that Impact Russian Role 
We	must	look	at	the	regional	and	domestic	poltical,	economic,	and	social	conditions	that	could	reduce	
Russian	influence	and	effectiveness.	First	of	all,	if	the	region	remains	conflict-free,	it	is	less	of	concern	
to	Russia.	This	 includes	 violence	within	 a	 country	 (such	as	Kyrgyzstan	 in	2010),	 or	 an	 increased	




example,	 relies	 heavily	 on	 the	 Rakhmon	 family,	 and	 Turkmenistan	 on	 the	 Berdymukhammedov	









the	 Eurasian	 Economic	 Union.	 Kazakhstan,	 Kyrgyzstan,	 and	 Tajikistan	 all	 have	 to	 follow	 the	






Fourth,	 in	terms	of	social	conditions,	 the	 immediate	 issue	that	 is	often	raised	 is	 the	role	of	ethnic	
Russians	within	 the	 countries	 of	 Central	 Asia.	 As	 the	 protection	 of	 Russians	 abroad	 is	 a	 security	
concern	articulated	in	Russian	security	documents	and	Mr.	Putin’s	speeches,	one	needs	to	assume	





Asian	populations	themselves	are	 increasing	at	healthy	rates.	That	said,	 if	 the	perception	that	the	
Russian	community	in	a	given	country	is	somehow	being	threatened,	one	could	expect	to	see	an	initial	
Russian	verbal	 reactions,	 leaving	 the	option	 for	 further	action.	Realistically,	 the	only	country	 this	
would	involve	would	be	Kazakhstan.	
A	 second	 “social	 element”	 needs	 to	 be	 recognized.	 While	 the	 Russian	 physical	 presence	 in	 the	
countries	has	decreased,	the	media	and	information	presence	remains	fairly	strong.	It	is	the	case	that	




more	 of	 the	 younger	 generation	 receive	 their	 news	 from	a	 range	 of	 internet	 sources	 outside	 the	
government	purview.	Perhaps	over	 time,	 this	diminution	of	Russian	media	 influence	will	 also	be	
repeated	in	the	Central	Asian	states,	as	online	access	continues	to	increase	therein.	








suggests	a	belt	of	 states	around	Russia	 itself,	offering	a	buffer	 from	external	 threats—national	or	
transnational.	Russia’s	success	in	making	the	region	a	true	“Near	Abroad”	would	be	detrimental	to	
US	South	and	Central	Asian	policies	which	emphasize	Central	Asian	connectivity.	
US Response to Russian Activities in Central Asia 
Overall,	the	US	could	have	“limited”	role	in	responding	to	Russia	activities	as	it	 is	doubtful	the	US	
would	devote	the	necessary	time	and	resources.	Central	Asia	is	not	a	high	priority	region	for	the	US,	
short	 of	 the	 Afghanistan	 theatre.	 However,	 it	 is	 this	 commitment	 to	 Afghanistan,	 as	 well	 as	 the	
broader	 message	 highlighted	 that	 the	 US	 Is	 determined	 to	 counter	 revisionist	 regimes,	 that	 the	
Central	Asian	region	needs	to	be	examined.	The	countries	collectively	chafe	at	that	notion	they	are	
part	of	some	“Russian	Near	Abroad.”	Officials	and	analysts	from	the	region	repeatedly	discuss	the	






parts	 of	 the	 Central	 Asian	 region	 for	 the	 US	 to	 remain	 engaged,	 especially	 if	 Russia	 employs	
competitive	activities	that	might	not	be	directly	countered	at	this	time.	
The	US’	 tool	 kit	 is	 rather	 limited	 in	 its	 ability	 to	 respond	 to	Russian	 competitive	 activities	 in	 the	
region.	 The	 US	 has	 no	 permanent	 military	 presence	 in	 Central	 Asia,	 nor	 does	 it	 have	 a	 strong	




actions	 noted	 above	 can	 be	 countered	 with	 a	 consistent	 and	 clear	messaging	 of	 what	 is	 proper	
international	behavior	and	what	is	not.	That	is,	if	and	when	Russia	asserts	itself	beyond	what	a	given	







Potential Russian Perceptions of US Actions 
High	on	the	list	of	US	actions	that	would	irk	Russia	would	be	the	return	of	US	military	bases	in	Central	
Asia,	 or	perhaps	 just	 a	 strong	 increase	 in	 security	 cooperation.	The	presence	of	US	 troops	 in	 the	
region	in	the	2000s	was	“accepted”	by	Russia	as	it	was	in	the	context	of	the	campaign	in	Afghanistan	
that	Russia	 itself	 vocally	 supported.	However,	 since	 the	 closure	 of	 the	Manas	Transit	 Center,	 the	
drawdown	of	NATO/US	troops	in	Afghanistan,	and	the	current	discussions	of	reconciliation/peace	
process/withdrawal	of	foreign	forces	in	Afghanistan,	the	Russian	position	on	non-CSTO/SCO	security	
















Asian	 states	 needs	 to	 create	more	 open	political	 systems,	more	 diverse	 and	 accessible	 economic	
markets,	just	social	systems	that	respect	all	citizens	regardless	of	ethnicity,	religion,	or	gender,	and	a	
stable	 and	 secure	 region	 that	 is	 void	 of	 violent	 extremist	 organizations.	 Obviously,	 the	 US-led	
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In	 terms	 of	 having	 a	 positive	 impact,	 the	 US	 already	 has	 a	 tool	 kit	 that	 can	 work—if	 properly	
resourced.	Security	cooperation	efforts,	modest	as	they	are,	engage	the	Central	Asian	security	forces	






Negative	 measures	 would	 include	 an	 acceptance	 of	 a	 Russian	 “sphere	 of	 influence,”	 first	 and	
foremost.	When	senior	US	officials	acknowledge	Russia’s	self-proclaimed	dominant	role	in	the	region,	
even	to	the	point	of	“understanding”	the	illegal	invasion	and	annexation	of	Crimea,	it	is	perceived	in	
the	 region	 that	 the	 US	 has	 lost	 interest	 in	 being	 a	 global	 partner.	 Second,	 reducing	 aid	 and	















Since	 the	 breakup	 of	 the	 Soviet	 Union,	 the	 Central	 Asian	 states	 have	 presented	 a	 new	 area	 of	
engagement	for	the	United	States.	However,	Russia	maintains	a	high	level	of	influence	throughout	
the	 region	 and	 seeks	 to	 bind	 the	 Central	 Asian	 states	 closer	 to	 itself	 while	 limiting	 the	 regional	
influence	of	outside	actors,	such	as	the	United	States	or	China,	and	creating	difficulties	in	the	level	of	
penetration	 that	 can	be	 achieved.	The	 region	 is	 somewhat	 chaotic,	with	 significant	 domestic	 and	












region	by	signaling	 that	 it	 is	a	viable	and	 interested	partner—a	move	 that	 can	be	expected	 to	be	
received	favorably	by	the	Central	Asian	states	(Rumer,	Sokolsky	&	Stronski,	2016).		
As	 Chinese	 economic	 investment	 increasingly	 turns	 into	 political	 capital	 and	 a	 greater	 security	
presence,	it	is	increasingly	likely	that	China	and	Russia	will	experience	greater	levels	of	competition	
with	each	other	in	coming	years	(Aron,	2019).	While	a	pragmatic	relationship	exists	between	the	two	
powers	 based	 on	 shorter	 term	mutual	 interests	 in	 the	 region	 and	 a	 close	 relationship	 between	
President	 Xi	 and	 President	 Putin,	 the	 two	 nations’	 interests	 in	 their	 respective	 near	 abroad	will	
diverge	in	the	longer	term	(Stronsky	&	Ng,	2018). 
Responding to Russia in Central Asia 
The	United	States’	role	in	Central	Asia	and	the	options	available	to	compete	with	Russia	in	the	region	
are	both	limited.	As	with	investment	in	the	Middle	East,	policy	makers	must	carefully	consider	the	
return	on	 investment	 in	Central	Asia	before	 committing	 excessive	 amounts	of	 time	or	 resources.	
Although	Russian	influence	in	the	region	has	declined	after	a	negative	reaction	in	Central	Asia	to	the	
Russian	 incursion	 into	 Ukraine,	 the	 Central	 Asian	 states	 and	 Russia	 maintain	 strong	 historical,	









From	 a	 diplomatic	 standpoint,	 a	 continued	 US	 presence	 in	 Central	 Asia	 is	 essential.	 Diplomatic	
relationships	 need	 to	 be	 cultivated	 within	 the	 Central	 Asian	 states,	 especially	 among	 those	
demonstrating	 the	 greatest	 potential	 for	 both	 economic	 and	 democratic	 development,	 such	 as	






The	 prevalence	 of	 social	 media	 and	 a	 globalized	 network	 lends	 credence	 to	 the	 value	 of	 the	
information	space	as	an	element	of	national	power	and	a	viable	counter	to	inaccurate	messaging	and	
propaganda.	 English	 language	 proficiency	 is	 correlated	 with	 higher	 levels	 of	 economic	 success,	
innovation,	and	social	development.	It	is	the	predominant	language	for	international	business,	and	
nations	understand	the	importance	of	learning	it	(Muslimin	2017)	The	United	States	should	focus	on	
information	 campaigns	 that	 promote	 English	 learning	 and	 the	 benefits	 of	 understanding	 the	
language.	 This	 maintains	 an	 interest	 in,	 and	 understanding	 of,	 Western	 and	 English	 dominant	















for	 containing	 Russia	 economically,	 such	 as	 blacklisting	major	 Russian	 financial	 institutions	 and	
removing	Russia	from	the	Society	for	Worldwide	Interbank	Financial	Telecommunication	network,	
can	also	serve	to	punish	Russia	globally	for	malign	actions	in	Central	Asia	and	elsewhere	(Harrell,	
2019).	While	 this	plays	out,	 the	United	States	can	encourage	greater	business	 investment	or	give	
financial	incentives	to	US	firms	interested	in	doing	business	in	Central	Asia.		


















One	 of	 these	 actions	 would	 be	 a	 new	 or	 expanded	 US	 posture	 in	 Central	 Asia,	 primarily	 the	
establishment	of	permanent	bases	within	the	region.	Large	scale	military	exercises,	depending	on	the	
scenario	and	nations	involved,	could	also	be	seen	as	provocative	in	nature.	Likewise,	any	perception	
of	 a	 US	 attempt	 to	 promote	 pro-Western	 or	 pro-democracy	 reforms	 in	 Central	 Asia	 would	 be	
reminiscent	 of	 past	 “color	 revolutions”	 that	 Russia	 abhors	 and	may	 go	 to	 extra	 lengths	 to	 quell.	
Revolutions	of	 this	kind	were	a	Russian	 red	 line	 in	 the	past,	 and	Russia’s	 close	 relationship	with	
Central	Asia	makes	it	more	likely	to	respond	to	unrest	there.	Outside	of	US	actions,	the	perception	















prevent	 the	 cultivation	 of	 terrorist	 organizations	 within	 national	 borders,	 the	 proliferation	 of	
weapons	of	mass	destruction,	and	produce	governments	that	promote	democracy	and	human	rights	
while	being	resilient	enough	to	resist	internal	and	external	threats.	Unfortunately,	the	current	reality	













































for	 balancing	 in	 Europe.	 The	 allies’	 goal	 should	 be	 deterrence.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 US	 should	
bilaterally	engage	Russia	to	peel	them	away	from	China’s	orbit.	The	US	can	work	with	Russia	in	ways	
that	 improve	the	US-Russia	relationship	without	detracting	 from	European	efforts	 to	balance	and	
deter.	This	can	be	applied	by	engaging	with	Russia	in	other	regional	or	functional	domains	that	do	
not	detract	from	European	efforts	to	deter. 
US Response to Russian Influence and Activities in China 
There	are	 two	avenues	 to	 reduce	Russian	 influence:	1)	Assist	 in	 strengthening	 the	economic	and	





them	away	 from	China’s	orbit.	The	US	can	work	with	Russia	 in	ways	 that	 improve	 the	US-Russia	





weapons	 are	 hard	 to	 attrit,	 and	when	 coupled	with	 a	 comprehensive	 C4ISR	 (command,	 control,	
communications,	 computer,	 intelligence,	 surveillance,	 and	 reconnaissance)	 architecture	 can	 be	
extremely	effective.	
The	 other	 challenge	 for	 Europeans	 confronting	 Russian	 aggression	 is	 cyber	 and	 electromagnetic	
pulse	(EMP)	attacks.	The	US	should	work	with	European	allies	to	strengthen	telecommunications	and	
electrical	 infrastructure	 to	 preclude	 Russian	 preemptive	 attacks.	 The	 General	 Data	 Protection	
Regulation	 (GDPR)	 should	be	 followed	with	 actions	 that	 seek	 to	 insulate	European	 citizens	 from	






















Diminishing the Russian-Chinese Relationship 





on	 Chinese	 predatory	 lending	 will	 enable	 European	 countries	 to	 avoid	 China’s	 debt	 diplomacy.	
Constant	engagement	with	allies	and	partners	to	reinforce	the	dangers	posed	by	revisionist	states	is	




“peaceful	conditions”	 it	will	continue	to	see	 influence	wane	in	International	 Institutions.	The	DoD	
should	work	with	the	Interagency	to	design	policies	that	disincentivize	US	corporate	behavior	that	
aids	Russia	 and	China.	 For	 example,	 the	US	 Securities	 and	Exchange	Commission	 (SEC)	 can	 be	 a	
powerful	 force	 to	 signal	 US	 companies	 about	 the	 possible	 risk	 of	 sanctions	 or	 other	 potential	
enforcement	measures.	Commerce’s	Bureau	of	Industry	and	Security	is	another	Interagency	partner	
that	 can	 use	 multi-lateral	 agreements	 like	 the	 Wassenaar	 Arrangement	 to	 signal	 potential	
enforcement	 actions.	 The	 entity	 list	 is	 an	 effective	 tool	 for	 discouraging	 company	 behavior	 that	











Russia	 is	not	yet	responsive	to	Chinese	 intermediate	ballistic	missiles,	but	 this	could	change	over	
time.		
One	source	of	potential	friction	between	Russia	and	China	is	the	Belt	and	Road	Initiative.	Reinforcing	





























Russian Strategic Calculus in the Middle East 
Actions in Syria 
Russia’s	 intervention	 in	 Syria	 and	 its	destabilizing	 actions	 in	 the	Middle	East	 serve	 to	 expand	 its	
sphere	of	influence,	posture	more	effectively,	and	avoid	encirclement	from	organizations	like	NATO	









under	Muammar	 Gaddafi.	 Russia’s	 lingering	 distaste	 for	 regime	 change	 and	 fear	 of	 international	
terrorism	made	the	situation	in	Syria	unacceptable,	and	appear	as	a	direct	threat	to	Russian	security	
interests,	 requiring	 decisive	 action	 before	 Western	 powers	 became	 involved	 (Sladden,	 Wasser,	
Connable,	Grand-Clement,	2017).		
Actions with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Countries and Iran 
Russia	continues	to	make	inroads	into	the	rest	of	the	Middle	East	in	order	to	garner	influence	and	
























secure	 US	 interests	 and	 advance	 American	 influence	 in	 the	 world	 (National	 Defense	 Strategy	
Summary,	2018).	The	United	States	has	a	role	in	responding	to	Russian	activities	in	the	Middle	East	













unfilled	 (Mathews,	2018).	Filling	 these	posts	with	experienced	diplomats	would	allow	 the	United	
States	 to	 better	 counter	Russian	diplomatic	 schemes,	 highlight	Russian	 failures,	 and	 give	 greater	









overtures	with	 Iran.	Russia	used	 the	recent	US	withdrawal	 from	the	 Joint	Comprehensive	Plan	of	
Action	to	establish	closer	relations	with	Iran	(Miles,	2018).	Following	Russia’s	zero-sum	logic,	any	
influence	 the	 United	 States	 gains	 with	 Iran	 will	 come	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 Russian	 influence.	 The	
continuous	use	of	public	diplomacy	in	the	Middle	East	can	be	used	to	promote	American	soft	power.	













both	 to	discredit	Russian	messaging	 and	 to	boost	US	 influence.	The	United	 States	 can	use	media	

















Partner	 cooperation	 also	provides	 a	 venue	 for	 the	 exportation	of	US	 soft	 power,	 for	 example,	 by	
cultural	 exchanges	 and	 International	 Military	 Education	 and	 Training.	 These	 programs	 often	
facilitate	sales	of	US	military	equipment	in	lieu	of	Russian	equipment,	and	provide	the	United	States	
with	both	peacetime	and	contingency	access	to	basing	and	infrastructure	in	partner	nations.	Security	
cooperation	 programs	 and	 exercises	 with	 partners	 are	 ways	 to	 show	 commitment	 and	 interest	
beyond	what	Russia	 is	able	 to	do.	The	United	States	currently	provides	about	half	of	 the	military	
hardware	for	the	Middle	East,	generating	a	great	deal	of	revenue	for	the	United	States	(Macias,	2018).	
Overwhelming	Foreign	Military	Sales	put	the	United	States	in	a	more	advantageous	position	when	it	
comes	 to	 leveraging	 influence,	 as	 military	 sales	 deals	 often	 come	 with	 long-term	 training,	
maintenance	contracts,	and	monitoring	provisions.	While	Foreign	Military	Sales	is	a	Department	of	
State	run	program,	the	Department	of	Defense	is	the	facilitator	and	executor	of	any	agreements	made.	















this	 have	 net	 economic	 benefit	 for	 the	United	 States,	 it	 keeps	 the	US	 involved	 in	 the	 region	 and	




hardship	 for	 Russia.	 Since	 Russia	 is	 already	 stagnating	 economically,	 this	 can	 impact	 Russia’s	
strategic	calculus.		
Russian “Redlines” and Escalation 
Russia	 has	 clearly	 defined	 redlines	 that	 are	 either	 mentioned	 in	 policy	 documents	 or	 were	
highlighted	in	the	past	by	Russian	leadership.	These	redlines	include	further	enlargement	of	NATO,	
threats	 to	 the	 current	 regime,	 loss	 of	 influence	 in	 the	 Russian	 near	 abroad,	 and	 actions	 or	 an	
imbalance	that	would	void	their	nuclear	deterrent	(Delpech,	2015)	Some	of	these	redlines	have	been	
tested	and	received	a	strong	Russian	response.	However,	at	other	times	actions	from	other	states	that	
normally	 could	 be	 perceived	 as	 crossing	 a	 “redline”	 elicited	 no	 response	 from	 Moscow.	 These	
instances	include	Color	Revolutions	that	occurred	in	the	early	2000s,	as	well	as	numerous	formally	
Soviet	or	Eastern	European	states	joining	NATO	before	2010.	Since	then,	Russia	has	escalated	several	






Strategic Implications for US Actions 
There	are	 strategic	 implications	 for	what	 the	United	States	does	or	does	not	do	 to	 compete	with	
Russia	in	the	Middle	East.	Continued,	calculated	actions	that	the	United	States	takes	in	the	Middle	
East	will	serve	to	maintain	vital	national	interests	in	the	long	term.	Key	interests	of	the	United	States	
in	 the	 region	 include	maintaining	 economic	 and	 basing	 access,	 preventing	 terrorist	 groups	 from	
attacking	the	United	States	or	allies,	and	spreading	American	influence	(National	Security	Strategy,	
2018).	While	it	is	apparent	that	Russia	has	increased	influence	in	the	Middle	East,	it	does	not	appear	
to	 want	 hegemonic	 dominance	 (Economist,	 2017).	 Since	 neither	 side	 wants	 armed	 conflict,	
competition	below	 the	 level	 of	 armed	 conflict	will	 likely	persist	 in	 the	 region	 long	 term,	 and	 the	
United	States	should	be	very	selective	in	prioritizing	the	type	and	location	of	competition	with	Russia	
in	the	Middle	East.	The	methods	that	the	United	States	uses	to	compete	should	always	be	aligned	with	






































































in	 a	 region	with	 rapidly	 developing	 emerging	markets	 and	 considerable	promise	 for	 growth	 and	
trade.	 These	 engagements	 often	 take	 the	 form	 of	 propping	 up	 embattled	 and	 isolated	 autocratic	
leaders	of	countries	that	are	rich	in	natural	resources.	This	provides	Moscow	considerable	leverage	
with	these	leaders	and	the	ability	to	undermine	previously	negotiated	political	settlements,	access	
natural	 resources	under	opaque	 agreements,	 and	weaken	democratic	 governance	 standards.	The	
United	 States	 can	 draw	 a	 distinction	 with	 Russia’s	 destabilizing	 role	 by	 pursuing	 a	 positive	










rights.	 A	 former	 Russian	 intelligence	 officer	 is	 now	 national	 security	 advisor	 and	 Moscow	 is	
considering	opening	up	a	military	base	 in	 the	CAR.	 In	 the	process,	Russia	undermined	 the	 fragile	
diplomatic	 efforts	 of	 the	 United	 Nations	 and	 France	 that	 had	 brought	 the	 competing	 factions	 in	





















billion.	 Targeted	 countries	 include	 old	 Cold	 War	 partnerships,	 mineral-rich	 Southern	 African	
Development	 Community	 (SADC)	 countries,	 and	 countries	 with	 large	 populations	 and	 growing	
markets	(see	table).		





















actor,	 embracing	 pariah	 leaders,	 deploying	mercenaries,	 bypassing	 arms	 embargos,	 and	 actively	
undermining	 existing	 internationally-brokered	 peace	 agreements	 so	 as	 to	 advance	 Moscow’s	
leverage	(Luhn	&	Nicholls,	2019).	In	some	cases,	Libya	and	CAR	for	example,	Russia	appears	to	be	
applying	 some	 of	 the	 lessons	 from	 its	 experience	 in	 Syria	 where	 support	 to	 an	 isolated	 leader	






Respond to Russia’s Disruptive Engagements by Reinforcing the Rule of Law 
Russia’s	varied	engagements	 in	Africa	call	 for	a	multi-tiered	policy	response.	To	be	clear,	 it	 is	 the	
destabilizing	 elements	 of	 Russia’s	 actions	 that	 are	 most	 concerning,	 especially	 those	 that	 are	
undermining	 established	norms	of	 accountable	 governance	 and	 the	upholding	of	 the	 rule	 of	 law.	
Importantly,	then,	the	response	from	the	United	States	should	not	be	reflexively	anti-Russian.	Russia	
and	African	governments	may	reasonably	wish	to	pursue	cooperative	partnerships.	Rather,	any	focus	












Africa	 Growth	 and	 Opportunity	 Act	 (AGOA),	 the	 President’s	 Emergency	 Plan	 for	 AIDS	 Relief	
(PEPFAR),	Power	Africa,	and	the	Millennium	Challenge	Corporation.	In	addition,	the	United	States	
has	 been	 the	 world	 leader	 for	 years	 in	 commitments	 of	 development	 assistance,	 support	 for	
peacekeeping,	foreign	direct	investment,	and	expanding	access	to	information	and	communications	
technology	in	Africa.		








vast	 majority	 of	 Africans	 aspire.	 Doing	 so	 can	 also	 more	 clearly	 juxtapose	 the	 extralegal	 and	
destabilizing	actions	taken	by	Russia.		










is	predicated	on	 changing	 this	 calculus	by	 increasing	 the	 costs	Moscow	 faces	 for	 its	destabilizing	
actions	in	Africa.	These	costs	can	take	multiple	forms.		
The	 first	 is	 reputational.	Russia’s	propping	up	of	unpopular	 regimes	 that	 are	 resistant	 to	power-
sharing	(such	as	in	Algeria,	South	Sudan,	Sudan,	and	Zimbabwe)	should	be	publicized	for	both	African	
and	 international	 audiences.	 These	 governments	 are	 using	 coercive	means	 to	 hold	 on	 to	 power	
against	 the	wishes	 of	 their	 youthful	 populations	 that	 are	 demanding	more	 say	 over	 the	 national	
decisions	affecting	 their	 lives.	Russian	diplomatic,	 financial,	 and	military	assistance	enables	 these	
leaders	to	remain	in	place.	Yet,	the	costs	of	these	policies	–	heavy-handed	government,	stagnant	living	
conditions,	elite	corruption	–	are	being	paid	for	by	African	citizens	thanks,	in	part,	to	Moscow.	The	




borders	 and	 affect	Russia’s	 ability	 to	 negotiate	 trade,	 investment,	 and	 security	 cooperation	deals	
elsewhere	on	the	continent.	
In	addition	to	reputational	costs,	changing	the	political	calculus	for	Russia	will	entail	increasing	the	
financial	 costs	 it	 bears	 for	 its	 destabilizing	 actions	 in	 Africa.	 Those	 individuals	 or	 organizations	
involved	 in	 Russia’s	 opaque	 natural	 resource	 deals	 on	 the	 continent	 should	 be	 considered	 for	




of	 Justice	 and	 the	 Security	 and	Exchanges	Commission,	 the	 FCPA	has	 previously	 been	 applied	 to	
organizations	operating	in	Russia,	Nigeria,	Angola,	and	Ghana,	among	others.		
The	 United	 States	 should	 also	 consider	 applying	 provisions	 of	 the	 2017	 Countering	 America’s	
Adversaries	through	Sanctions	Act	for	destabilizing	Russian	actions	in	Africa.	The	law	establishes	the	














leader,	 contravenes	 the	 Organization	 for	 African	 Unity’s	 1972	 Convention	 for	 the	 Elimination	 of	
Mercenaries	 in	 Africa.	 In	 fact,	 Africa	 was	 one	 of	 the	 earliest	 adopters	 of	 such	 a	 ban	 given	 the	





security	more	generally,	can	create	 incentives	 for	Moscow	to	dial	back	 its	destabilizing	actions	 in	
Africa.		
Increase the Costs for Russia’s African Enablers 
Russia	gains	leverage	for	these	destabilizing	actions	through	the	complicity	of	often	unelected	and	
isolated	 African	 interlocutors	 who,	 lacking	 legitimacy,	 turn	 to	 Moscow	 for	 financial	 support	 or	


























Sustaining Engagements with an Emerging Africa  
Given	its	emerging	markets,	natural	resource	wealth,	strategic	location,	and	growing	importance	in	
international	fora,	interest	in	Africa	is	growing	among	multiple	external	actors,	not	just	Russia.	Over	
350	 new	 embassies	 and	 consulates	 have	 been	 established	 in	 Africa	 by	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 foreign	
governments	since	2010.	By	building	on	 its	solid	 foundation	of	engagements	 in	Africa,	 the	United	
States	is	well-positioned	to	be	a	part	of	further	mutually	beneficial	partnerships	in	the	future.	To	do	
so,	 however,	will	 require	 sustained	 engagements.	 Such	 engagements	 can	 help	 set	 a	 bar	 for	 good	
governance	 and	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 that	 has	 direct	 benefits	 for	 stability,	 development,	 and	 ongoing	





















Chapter 23. Weaponizing Peace: Colombia’s Demobilized FARC as a 





Russia	 has	 routinely	 engaged	 in	 operations	 in	 the	 gray	 zone—the	 space	 between	 overt	military	
conflict	 and	 normal	 peacetime	 competition—in	 furtherance	 of	 its	 revisionist	 aims.	 While	 these	
actions	 have	 been	 most	 readily	 apparent	 in	 Russia’s	 near	 abroad,	 their	 reach	 is	 in	 fact	 global.	
Nonetheless,	the	ways	in	which	Russia	exerts	itself	in	areas	farther	afield,	where	it	cannot	effectively	
project	 military	 force	 and/or	 leverage	 ethnically	 Russian	 local	 populations,	 are	 distinct.	 This	
contribution	begins	by	explaining	why	Russia	would	be	interested	in	intervening	in	Colombia,	given	
its	 extremely	 close	 security	 and	 economic	 relations	with	 the	US,	 as	well	 as	 its	 desire	 to	 retaliate	
against	the	US	for	its	perceived	meddling	in	Russia’s	traditional	sphere	of	influence	(e.g.	Ukraine).	It	




overt	military	conflict	and	normal	peace	time	competition	–	 in	 furtherance	of	 its	revisionist	aims.	
These	actions	have	been	most	readily	apparent	in	Russia’s	near	abroad.	For	example,	in	2014,	Russia	
skillfully	leveraged	all	elements	of	national	power	to	quickly	annex	Crimea,	while	also	engaging	in	a	
less	 well	 executed	 campaign	 in	 Donbas,	 eastern	 Ukraine	 (Vasilyeva,	 2018).	 Nevertheless,	 these	
activities	 are	 not	 limited	 to	 Russia’s	 traditional	 sphere	 of	 influence.	 For	 example,	 Russia	 also	
attempted	 to	 sway	 public	 opinion	 and	 otherwise	 influence	 the	 outcome	 of	 pivotal	 elections	
throughout	Western	 European	 and	 North	 American	 democracies.	 These	 attempts	 have	 included	






























and	 trolls	 circulated	disinformation	–	 such	as	 the	 rumor	 that	Mexican	 citizens	would	have	 to	 re-
register	to	vote	in	the	elections	–	on	social	media	networks.	Russian	media,	such	as	RT,	ran	extensive	









partnership.	 Indeed,	 Colombia	 is	 considered	 the	 hallmark	 of	 US	 efforts	 to	 build	 partner	 capacity	
(Ramsey,	2009).	So	much	so	that	the	US	has	leveraged	Colombian	trainers	and	Colombian	facilities	
to	 build	 partner	 capacity	 in	 dozens	 of	 third	 countries,	 a	 process	 known	 as	 triangulated	 security	
cooperation	(Tickner,	2014,	p.	1).	Moreover,	the	US	and	Colombia	maintain	close	economic	ties.		
Consequently,	 it	 is	not	surprising	that	Russia	has	historically	tried	to	exert	 influence	in	Colombia.	








was	 seeking	 to	 acquire	 Russian	 made	 surface-to-air	 missiles	 (Falconer,	 2008).	 Following	 the	
operation,	Russian	Foreign	Minister,	Sergei	Lavrov	publicly	intervened	to	declare	Bout’s	innocence	
and	to	attempt	to	prevent	his	extradition	to	the	US.	Bout	was	previously	involved	in	a	high	profile	









concerns	regarding	the	extremely	weak	nature	of	 the	transitional	 justice	regime	and	the	 fact	 that	
former	 FARC	 fighters	would	 not	 only	 be	 allowed	 to	 run	 for	 political	 office,	 but	would	 in	 fact	 be	
guaranteed	 seats	 in	 Colombia’s	 congress	 (Koven,	 2016).	 The	 former	Commanding	General	 of	 the	
Peruvian	Army,	Otto	Guibovich,	who	has	studied	the	issue	closely,	pontificated	that	the	FARC	had	
managed	 to	 reverse	Clausewitz’	 oft	 cited	quote	 that	 “war	 is	 the	 continuation	 of	 politics	 by	 other	
means,”	 noting	 that	 “politics	would	 be	 the	 continuation	 of	 their	 [the	 FARC’s]	war	 through	 other	
means	that	begin	with	congressmen	and	delegates	in	the	parliament”	(O.	Guibovich,	interview	with	
author,	 October,	 17,	 2016).	 A	 minimally	 revised	 agreement	 was	 ultimately	 ratified	 not	 by	 the	
Colombian	people	but	by	the	legislature	and	supreme	court.	




for	 cyberattacks	 from	 abroad	 related	 to	 the	 elections	 (El	 Colombiano,	 2018).	 Before	 the	
Congressional	elections	in	March	2018,	Colombian	Defense	Minister	Luis	Carlos	Villegas	announced	
that	 four	 cyberattacks	 aimed	 to	 shut	 down	 Colombia’s	 National	 Voter	 Registry	 (DW,	 2018).	
Colombian	intelligence	agencies	also	documented	almost	60,000	attacks	against	the	National	Civil	













is	 certainly	 possible	 –	 could	 undermine	 the	 agreement	 (Felbab-Brown,	 2018).	 Doing	 so	 would	
incentivize	thousands	of	former	FARC	fighters	to	again	take	up	arms.	It	is	already	the	case	that	the	
FARC’s	 1st	 Front	 vowed	 not	 to	 demobilize	 and	 to	 continue	 the	 fight	 (Koven,	 2016).	 In	 addition,	









close,	 polarized	 elections,	 like	 Colombia.	 Russia	 may	 try	 to	 manipulate	 the	 media	 environment,	




technical	 assistance	 to	 secure	 information	 infrastructure.	 In	 this	 case,	 given	 the	 close	 security	
cooperation	between	 the	US	and	Colombia,	 this	 is	 especially	 likely	 to	be	an	option.	The	 threat	of	
disinformation	 on	 social	 and	 traditional	 media	 networks	 is	 more	 insidious.	 The	 best	 long-term	




























































































PART V. WHAT CAPABILITIES DOES THE US NEED TO EFFECTIVELY 
RESPOND TO RUSSIAN GRAY ZONE ACTIVITIES? 










the	 varied	 groups	working	 this	 problem,	 and	 the	 development	 of	 doctrine	 is	 not	 possible.	When	
considering	the	capabilities	the	US	requires	to	respond	effectively	to	actions	in	the	competitive	zone,	
many	 of	 the	 teams	 highlighted	 the	 central	 role	 of	 populations	 in	 the	 success	 or	 failure	 of	 gray	
activities	and	strategies.	They	suggest	that	success	in	the	gray	zone	hinges	on	the	ability	to	influence	
populations,	 and	 state	 and	 non-state	 actors,	 and	minimze	 the	 influence	 of	 actors	 inimical	 to	 US	
interests.	 Consequently,	 a	 better	 understanding	 of	 the	 human	 /	 cognitive	 domain,	 enabling	 the	
creation	of	effective	narratives,	is	identified	as	critical	to	US	success.	














will	 be	 most	 effective	 if	 it	 is	 based	 on	 a	 consistent	 definition.	 Before	 the	 question	 of	 necessary	



















An	 adversary's	 purposeful	 use	 of	 single	 or	multiple	 elements	 of	 power	 to	 achieve	 security	 objectives	 by	way	 of	
activities	that	are	typically	ambiguous	or	cloud	attribution,	and	exceed	the	threshold	of	ordinary	competition,	yet	
intentionally	fall	below	the	level	of	open	warfare.	
In	 most	 cases,	 once	 significant,	 attributable	 coercive	 force	 has	 been	 used,	 the	 activities	 are	 no	 longer	
considered	to	be	in	the	gray	zone	but	have	transitioned	into	the	realm	of	traditional	warfare.	







Challenge	 common	 understandings,	 conventions,	 and	 international	 norms	 while	 stopping	 short	 of	 clear	











Figure 2: SMA Gray Zone Definition 
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in	 Ukraine	 and	 Crimea,	 and	 wider	 political	 influence	
operations,	 its	willingness	 to	openly	 flout	 international	 rules	
and	norms	to	achieve	 its	strategic	goals.	 In	other	 instances	 it	
has	 challenged	 the	 assumed	 universality	 of	 international	
norms	supporting	civil	rights	and	liberties	and	positioned	itself	
as	the	champion	of	rule	of	law.	Such	was	the	case	with	Russia’s	








How Should the US Respond? 
The	SMA	project	teams	identified	several	factors	that	can	contribute	to	effective	US	response	to	gray	
strategies	and	activities.		




intent	when	 an	 action	 is	 taken	 in	 ignorance	 of	 the	 consequences,	 or	 in	 self-defense,	may	 lead	 to	



























agencies	 is	 a	 significantly	 superior	 approach	 to	 taking	 select	 actions	 in	 response	 to	 Russian	
aggression.	This	approach	would	be	aided	by	 the	DoD	expanding	 its	definitions	of	maneuver	and	
objectives	to	better	account	for	the	human	aspects	of	military	operations.	
What Capabilities Does the US Need? 
Engagment	 with	 population	 across	 multiple	 arenas	
(economic,	 political,	 media	 and	 others)	 is	 a	 defining	
characteristic	 of	 many	 gray	 actions	 and	 all	 gray	
strategies.	 Gray	 zone	 actors	 are	 consistently	 engaging	










to	 US	 and/or	 partner	 nation	 interests.	 Understanding	 the	 drivers	 and	 buffers	 of	 stability	within	
specific	 regions	and	countries	can	help	analysts	and	planners	 identify	actors	 that	are	 likely	 to	be	
vulnerable	to	another	actor’s	gray	actions	and	strategies.	It	can	also	help	identify	the	actors	they	are	
vulnerable	 to	 in	 specific	
areas	 (e.g.	domestic	political	





nations	 to	 be	 effective,	 we	
also	 need	 to	 be	 able	 to	
anticipate	 with	 greater	
accuracy	 the	 likely	
population	 response	 (at	 the	
group	level,	not	just	the	state	
level)	to	our	actions.	Figure	2	
highlights	 the	 aspects	 of	 the	
gray	zone	on	which	the	SMA	
team	 analyses	 indicated	 the	
US	and	partner	nations	should	build	understanding.	It	also	shows	the	areas	in	which	the	analyses	













Figure 3: US Capability Gaps for Addressing Gray (Competitive) Zone Challenges 
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Deeper Understanding of the Human/Cognitive Domain 
When	considering	capabilities	in	the	context	of	gray	zone	challenges,	we	need	to	think	first	in	terms	
of	 information.	 Information	 provides	 a	 richer	 understanding	 of	 the	 operating	 environment	 and	
emphasizes	the	human/cognitive	domain.	Specifically,	the	US	must:	
• Broaden	 its	 understanding	 of	 the	 strategic	 and	 operational	 environments	 to	 better	
incorporate	the	human	/	cognitive	domain		
• Consider	the	non-military	arenas	and	non-state	level	(see	Figure	2)	of	the	gray	zone	when	
developing	 I&W,	 and	 deterrence	 and	 response	
options		
• Think	beyond	purely	kinetic	responses	and	develop	
ways	 to	 shape	 the	 international	 environment	 to	
reduce	the	motivation	for	actors	to	engage	in	gray	
activities	 in	 the	 first	 place.	 This	 will	 require	
addressing	the	broad	question	of	the	sustainability	























































efforts	 to	 reduce	 European	 dependence	 on	 Russian	 energy	 and	 discourage	 future	 Sino-Russian	
alliance	by	developing	a	robust	capability	to	foster	distrust	and	unease	between	Russia	and	China. 
Understanding Russian Gray Zone Efforts 
The	 chief	 capability	 the	 United	 States	 needs	 in	 competing	 with	 Russia	 in	 the	 gray	 zone	 is	
understanding	its	vertical	decision-making	and	how	to	effectively	compete	given	the	derived	distinct	




Russia	 defines	 activities	 in	 the	 gray	 zone	 as	 zero-sum.	These	 activities	 include	 threatening	 other	
states	militarily,	or	compromising	their	societies,	economies,	and	governments	by	employing	a	range	




the	world.	 It	 is	 executing	 active	 and	 at	 times	 aggressive	 foreign	 and	 security	 policies	 in	 its	 self-
proclaimed	 near	 aboard,	 Afghanistan,	 and	 Syria.	 It	 has	 a	 growing	 capacity	 to	 exercise	 malign	
influence	in	Europe	and	abroad,	including	in	the	United	States.		
While	the	United	States	has	extensive	experience	in	contributing	to	European	security	by	maintaining	
close	 relationships	with	 our	European	 allies	 and	partners,	 it	 still	 lacks	 a	 broad	understanding	 of	
Russia’s	gray	zone	capabilities	and	intentions	as	they	are	pursued	around	the	globe	and	in	multiple	









Whole of US Government Response 
Arguably	the	greatest	weakness	of	the	US	Government	to	effectively	compete	with	Russia	below	the	
level	 of	 armed	 conflict	 is	 the	 lack	 of	 a	 coherent	 and	 unified	whole-of-government	 effort.	 The	US	










federal	 agent.	 Beyond	 this	 designation,	 the	 Executive	 Branch	 would	 also	 need	 to	 empower	 the	
DoS/EUR	with	appropriate	authorities	and	funding	to	achieve	this	mandate.		












Cyber	 Command,	 various	 agencies	 of	 the	 Intelligence	 Community,	 the	 Broadcasting	 Board	 of	
Governors,	and	the	Global	Engagement	Center	(GEC).	While	the	RIG	supports	a	 larger	US	national	
strategy	 of	 information	 operations,	 its	 current	 efforts	 are	 limited	 to	 the	 European	 theater	 of	
operations.	 The	 RIG	 has	made	 significant	 progress	 in	 addressing	 and	 countering	 Russian	malign	































oil,	 liquid	 fuels,	 coal,	 and	 greater	 quantities	 of	 liquid	 natural	 gas	 (LNG).	 Although	Department	 of	
Defense	 operational	 units	 are	 not	 dependent	 upon	 Russian	 energy,	 several	 European	 allies	 and	
partners	 are	 alarmingly	 reliant	 on	Russia	 as	 a	 source	 of	 energy,	 and	 are	 subject	 to	 coercion	 and	













LTG Theodore D. Martin 
Lieutenant	 General	 Theodore	 D.	Martin	 assumed	 duties	 as	 Deputy	
Commanding	General/Chief	of	Staff,	United	States	Army	Training	and	
Doctrine	Command,	March	5,	2018.	
The	Martin	 family’s	military	 heritage	 harkens	 back	more	 than	 ten	
generations	to	1776	when	Private	Daniel	Martin	enlisted	in	the	1st	
New	 Jersey	 Infantry	 Regiment	 and	 fought	 the	 British	 during	 the	
American	Revolution,	 including	 service	 at	 Valley	 Forge.	 Lieutenant	
General	Martin	graduated	from	the	United	States	Military	Academy	in	
1983	 and	 was	 commissioned	 a	 second	 lieutenant	 of	 Armor.	 His	
military	education	includes	the	Armor	Officer	Basic	Course	(Cavalry	






Infantry	 Division,	 Federal	 Republic	 of	 Germany;	 Commander,	 1st	 Squadron,	 10th	 US	 Cavalry	
Regiment	(Buffalo	Soldiers),	4th	Infantry	Division,	Fort	Hood,	Texas	and	Operation	Iraqi	Freedom	in	








Arms	 Command-Training,	 Fort	 Leavenworth,	 Kansas;	 Advisor	 to	 the	 Imam	Mohammed	 bin	 Saud	
Brigade	and	later	the	Prince	Sa’ad	bin	Abdul	Rahman	Brigade,	Kingdom	of	Saudi	Arabia;	Deputy	Chief	











Squadron	 -75	 (VA-75)	 flying	 A-6E	 Intruders.	 He	 flew	 F/A-18C	
Hornets	on	USS	Dwight	D.	Eisenhower	(CVN	68)	with	Strike	Fighter	
Squadron-81	 (VFA-81),	 USS	 John	 F.	 Kennedy	 (CV	 67)	 and	 USS	
George	 Washington	 (CVN	 73)	 with	 VFA-136.	 He	 deployed	 twice	
with	USS	John	C.	Stennis	(CVN	74)	as	commanding	officer	of	Strike	
Fighter	 Squadron	146	 (VFA-146).	He	 flew	F/A-18Cs,	 F/A-18E/Fs	
and	 EA-18Gs	while	 serving	 as	 commander	 of	 Carrier	 Air	Wing	 2	
(CVW-2)	while	assigned	on	USS	Ronald	Reagan	(CVN	76)	as	strike	
warfare	commander	for	Carrier	Strike	Group	9.	
Ashore,	 Czerewko’s	 tours	 include	 VFA-106	 as	 a	 fleet	 replacement	 squadron	 instructor	 pilot	 and	
assistant	safety	and	assistant	training	officer;	electronic	warfare	branch	chief	with	the	Joint	Staff,	J	39	













mid-‘90s,	 the	 rise	 of	 terrorist,	 insurgent,	 and	 transnational	 criminal	
networks.	His	books	 include	Networks	and	Netwars	(2001),	The	Reagan	







Ms. Anna Borshchevskaya  
Anna	 Borshchevskaya	 is	 a	 Senior	 Fellow	 at	 The	 Washington	 Institute,	
focusing	 on	 Russia's	 policy	 toward	 the	 Middle	 East.	 She	 is	 also	 a	 Ph.D.	
candidate	 at	George	Mason	University.	 In	 addition,	 she	 is	 a	 fellow	at	 the	
European	Foundation	for	Democracy.	She	was	previously	with	the	Atlantic	




Criterion,	 and	 the	Middle	 East	 Quarterly.	 Until	 recently	 she	 conducted	
translation	and	analysis	for	the	U.S.	Army's	Foreign	Military	Studies	Office	
and	 its	 flagship	publication,	Operational	Environment	Watch,	 and	wrote	a	
foreign	affairs	column	for	Forbes.	She	 is	 the	author	of	 the	February	2016	
Institute	monograph,	Russia	in	the	Middle	East.	
Her	 areas	 of	 expertise	 are	Russia's	Middle	East	 policy,	US-Russian	 relations,	 and	Russian	 foreign	
policy.	 She	holds	a	M.A.	 from	 Johns	Hopkins	University	School	of	Advanced	 International	 Studies	
(SAIS)	and	a	B.A.	from	the	State	University	of	New	York	at	Geneseo.	
Dr. Belinda Bragg 
Dr.	Belinda	Bragg	 is	a	Principal	Research	Scientist	 for	NSI.	She	has	
provided	core	support	for	DoD	Joint	Staff	and	STRATCOM	Strategic	
Multi-layer	Analysis	 (SMA)	projects	 for	 the	past	 six	 years.	 She	has	
worked	on	projects	dealing	with	nuclear	deterrence,	state	stability,	
US–China	and	US-Russia	relations,	and	VEOs.	Dr.	Bragg	has	extensive	
experience	 reviewing	 and	 building	 social	 science	 models	 and	
frameworks.	She	is	one	of	the	two	designers	of	a	stability	model,	(the	
StaM)	 that	 has	 been	 used	 analyze	 stability	 efforts	 in	 Afghanistan,	
state	stability	in	Pakistan	and	Nigeria,	and	at	the	city-level	to	explore	
the	drivers	and	buffers	of	instability	in	megacities,	with	a	case	study	
of	Dhaka.	 Prior	 to	 joining	NSI,	 Dr.	 Bragg	was	 a	 visiting	 lecturer	 in	
International	Relations	at	Texas	A&M	University	in	College	Station.	Her	research	focuses	on	decision-	
making,	causes	of	conflict	and	political	instability,	and	political	uses	of	social	media.	Dr.	Bragg	earned	









Mr. Pavel Devyatkin 
Pavel	Devyatkin	is	a	Research	Associate	at	The	Arctic	Institute,	
where	 his	 research	 areas	 include	 Russia's	 Arctic	 strategy,	
extractive	 industries,	 defense	 and	 security,	 and	 maritime	







Prior	 to	 joining	 The	 Arctic	 Institute,	 Devyatkin	worked	 as	 an	 analyst	 of	 environmental	 issues	 in	












Sharana	 S4,	 Operations/Logistics	 Officer	 for	 Joint	 Task	 Force-Port	
Opening	operations	in	support	of	operations	in	Haiti	and	Diego	Garcia,	
and	Brigade	S4	for	the	1st	Stryker	Brigade	Combat	Team.	MAJ	Dyet’s	
overseas	 experience	 includes	 deployments	 in	 support	 Operation	
ENDURING	FREEDOM,	Afghanistan,	Operation	UNIFIED	RESPONSE,	Haiti,	Operation	Spartan	Shield,	
Kuwait,	 steady	state	operations	 in	South	Korea,	 and	Operation	ENDURING	FREEDOM	from	Diego	
Garcia.	
MAJ	Dyet’s	military	education	includes	the	Transportation	Officer	Basic	Course,	Combined	Logistics	













actors,	as	well	as	 transnational	organized	crime	and	populism	 in	 the	
region.		
Dr.	Ellis	has	published	over	240	works,	including	the	2009	book	China	
in	 Latin	 America:	 The	 Whats	 and	 Wherefores,	 the	 2013	 book	 The	
Strategic	 Dimension	 of	 Chinese	 Engagement	 with	 Latin	 America,	 the	
2014	book,	China	on	the	Ground	in	Latin	America,	and	the	2018	book,	
Transnational	Organized	Crime	in	Latin	America	and	the	Caribbean.	
Dr.	 Ellis	 has	 presented	 his	 work	 in	 a	 broad	 range	 of	 business	 and	




Dr.	Ellis	has	 also	been	awarded	 the	Order	of	Military	Merit	 José	María	Córdova	 by	 the	Colombian	
government	for	his	scholarship	on	security	issues	in	the	region.	
Dr.	Ellis	holds	a	PhD	in	political	science	with	a	specialization	in	comparative	politics.	
Mr. Daniel J. Flynn 
Mr.	Dan	Flynn	was	selected	to	be	the	first	Director	of	IC	Net	Assessments	
in	the	Office	of	the	Director	of	National	Intelligence	in	August	2018.	In	
this	 position,	 Mr.	 Flynn	 is	 responsible	 for	 developing	 forecasts	 and	
comparative	 assessments	 to	 identify	 emerging	 challenges	 and	
opportunities	for	US	intelligence	capabilities.		
Prior	to	his	current	assignment,	Mr.	Flynn	was	the	Director	of	the	Global	
Security	 Program	 for	 the	 National	 Intelligence	 Council’s	 (NIC’s)	
Strategic	 Futures	 Group.	 In	 this	 position,	 he	 led	 national-level	
assessments	of	long-term	and	crosscutting	military-security	issues	for	












Mr.	 Flynn	 is	 a	 “Distinguished	 Graduate”	 of	 the	 National	War	 College	 earning	 an	M.S.	 in	 National	
Security	Strategy.	He	also	earned	a	B.S.	in	Aerospace	Engineering	from	Boston	University.	Mr.	Flynn	
is	an	ODNI	“Plank	Holder.”	
Dr. Daniel Goure 
Dr.	 Goure	 is	 Senior	Vice	 President	 with	 the	 Lexington	 Institute,	 a	




US	 Government.	 Most	 recently,	 he	 was	 a	 member	 of	 the	 2001	
Department	of	Defense	Transition	Team.	Dr.	Goure	spent	two	years	in	
the	 US	 Government	 as	 the	 director	 of	 the	 Office	 of	 Strategic	
Competitiveness	 in	 the	 Office	 of	 the	 Secretary	 of	 Defense.	 He	 also	
served	as	a	senior	analyst	on	national	security	and	defense	issues	with	












American	 Defense	 College.	 From	 2001-2007,	 Dr.	 Goure	 was	 an	 adjunct	 professor	 in	 graduate	













Ms. Abigail C. Kamp 
Abigail	Kamp	 is	 a	Research	Assistant	 for	 the	Political	 Instability,	
Counterterrorism	 and	 Gray	 Zone	 Portfolio	 at	 the	 National	
Consortium	for	the	Study	of	Terrorism	and	Responses	to	Terrorism	
(START),	 located	 at	 the	 University	 of	 Maryland	 (UMD).	 In	 her	
current	 role,	 she	 studies	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 topics	 including	 US–	
Colombia	relations	during	the	development	and	execution	of	Plan	
Colombia,	misalignment	of	US	counterterrorism	efforts	across	the	
interagency,	 and	 community-based	 violence	 prevention	 and	
intervention	efforts.		
Prior	to	graduate	school,	she	supported	a	variety	of	federal	clients	
as	 a	 consultant	 at	Booz	Allen	Hamilton.	While	 there,	 she	drafted	
two	 Congressional	 reports	 on	 military	 personnel	 issues	 and	
managed	the	coordination	process	to	ensure	timely	delivery	to	Capitol	Hill.	She	was	also	a	research	
assistant	on	the	Immigration	and	Homeland	Security	team	at	the	Bipartisan	Policy	Center	where	she	





Dr. Roger Kangas 
Dr.	Roger	Kangas	is	the	Academic	Dean	and	a	Professor	of	Central	
Asian	 Studies	 at	 the	 Near	 East	 South	 Asia	 Center	 for	 Strategic	
Studies,	a	U.S.	Department	of	Defense	regional	center.	Previously	
Dr.	Kangas	served	as	a	Professor	of	Central	Asian	Studies	at	the	
George	 C.	 Marshall	 Center	 for	 European	 Security	 in	 Garmisch-
Partenkirchen,	 Germany;	 Deputy	 Director	 of	 the	 Central	 Asian	
Institute	 at	 Johns	 Hopkins	 University	 School	 of	 Advanced	
















Dr. Mark N. Katz 
Mark	N.	Katz	(Ph.D.,	MIT)	is	a	professor	of	government	and	politics	
at	 the	 George	 Mason	 University	 Schar	 School	 of	 Policy	 and	




of	 International	 Affairs	 in	 Helsinki	 (April-September).	 During	
2018,	 he	 was	 a	 Fulbright	 Scholar	 at	 the	 School	 of	 Oriental	 and	
African	Studies	(SOAS)	in	London	(January-March),	and	was	then	
the	2018	Sir	William	Luce	Fellow	at	Durham	University	in	the	UK	
(April-June).	 Links	 to	 many	 of	 his	 publications	 can	 be	 found	 at	
www.marknkatz.com.	
Dr. Barnett S. Koven 
Barnett	 S.	 Koven	 is	 the	 Training	 Director,	 a	 Senior	
Researcher,	 and	 the	 Political	 Instability,	 Counterterrorism	
and	Gray	Zone	Portfolios	Lead	at	the	University	of	Maryland’s	
(UMD)	National	Consortium	for	the	Study	of	Terrorism	and	
Responses	 to	 Terrorism	 (START),	 a	 U.S.	 Department	 of	
Homeland	Security	(DHS)	Center	of	Excellence.	He	is	also	the	
Founder	 and	 CEO	 of	 BSK	 Consulting,	 L.L.C.,	 a	 boutique	
consultancy	 specializing	 in	 practitioner	 education	 and	
mixed-methods	 (quantitative	 and	 qualitative)	 research	 in	
support	of	national	security	practitioners	and	policy-makers.	
In	addition,	Koven	is	a	Fellow	at	the	Jack	D.	Gordon	Institute	
for	 Public	 Policy	 at	 Florida	 International	 University,	 a	
Professorial	 Lecturer	 in	 Political	 Science	 &	 International	
Affairs	at	the	George	Washington	University	(GWU),	an	Associate	Member	of	the	Graduate	Faculty	






Koven	 has	 conducted	 extensive	 overseas	 research	 in	 conflict	 and	 post-conflict	 zones.	 His	 work	
employs	 cutting-edge	 quantitative	 and	 qualitative	 methods	 to	 answer	 pressing	 defense	 and	
homeland	 security	 questions.	 Specifically,	 he	 focuses	 on	 issues	 pertaining	 to	 counterinsurgency,	
counterterrorism,	 countering	 violent	 extremism,	 counter-narcotics,	 gray	 zone	 conflict,	 security	








In	 addition	 to	 his	 aforementioned	 academic	 affiliations,	 Koven	 regularly	 instructs	 Combating	
Terrorism	Seminars	at	the	Federal	Law	Enforcement	Training	Center	in	Charleston,	SC.	He	has	also	
lectured	 during	 Joint	 Special	 Operations	 University’s	 Special	 Operations	 Forces	 Interagency	
Collaboration	Course,	the	Defense	Intelligence	Agency’s	Advanced	Counterterrorism	Analyst	Course	
and	 overseas	 as	 part	 of	 the	 Diplomatic	 Security	 Service’s	 Global	 Anti-terrorism	 Training	
Assistance/Special	Program	for	Embassy	Augmentation	and	Response	Executive	Forum	on	Foreign	
Terrorist	Fighters	Consultation.	In	addition,	Koven	has	taught	at	the	National	Reconnaissance	Office	
as	 part	 of	 the	 Executive	Master	 of	 Public	Management	 Program.	Moreover,	 he	 is	 also	 a	 frequent	
presenter	 during	 the	 various	 lecture	 series	 and	 conferences	 curated	 by	 the	 Strategic	Multi-layer	
Assessment	Branch	of	the	DoD,	as	well	as	to	myriad	other	US	government	and	university	audiences.	
Finally,	Koven	routinely	provides	terrorism	analysis	on	national	and	international	media	broadcasts.	






Dr. Jeremy W. Lamoreaux 
Jeremy	W.	Lamoreaux	is	a	professor	of	international	studies	and	political	
science	 at	 Brigham	Young	University	 –	 Idaho.	His	 research	 focuses	 on	
relations	between	the	West	and	Russia,	specifically	as	played	out	in	NATO	
and	the	EU.	Geographically,	his	focus	is	primarily	on	the	Baltic	States.	He	
has	 published	 in	 European	 Security,	 European	 Politics	 and	 Society,	
Geopolitics,	Journal	on	Baltic	Security,	Journal	of	Baltic	Studies,	Palgrave	





Dr. Marlene Laruelle 






regional	 environment,	 China’s	 presence	 in	 the	 region,	 and	 the	
“Eurasian”	 dimension	 of	 Russia’s	 foreign	 policy	 for	 the	 past	 two	
decades.	 She	 is	 currently	 a	 co-PI	 on	 a	three-year	 project,	Russian,	
Chinese,	 Militant,	 and	 Ideologically	 Extremist	 Messaging	 Effects	 on	











foreign	 policy.	 He	 also	 serves	 as	 the	 president	 of	 the	 Special	
Operations	 Research	 Association	 and	 editor	 of	 Special	 Operations	
Journal,	published	by	Routledge.	Prior	 to	 joining	 JSOU,	Marsh	was	a	
Professor	of	National	Security	and	Strategic	Studies	at	the	U.S.	Army	
School	of	Advanced	Military	Studies	 (SAMS).	Before	 that,	Dr.	Marsh	
taught	 irregular	warfare,	 global	 terrorism,	 and	COIN	 at	 the	U.S.	 Air	
Force	Special	Operations	School,	Hurlburt	Field,	Florida.	From	1999-
2011	Dr.	Marsh	taught	at	Baylor	University,	moving	up	the	ranks	from	
assistant	 professor	 to	 full	 professor.	 Dr.	 Marsh	 holds	 the	 Ph.D.	 in	
political	 science	 from	 the	 University	 of	 Connecticut,	 in	 addition	 to	
having	completed	graduate	study	at	Moscow	State	University.	He	conducted	much	of	his	dissertation	
research	at	the	Russian	Academy	of	Science,	and	later	was	a	post-doctoral	fellow	at	the	Institute	on	




more	 than	60	 journal	articles	and	chapters	 in	edited	collections,	 as	well	 as	editing	–	with	Ruslan	
Pukhov	–	Elite	Warriors:	Special	Operations	Forces	from	Around	the	World.	He	is	currently	writing	a	
book	on	Russian	grand	strategy.		
Dr. Robert Person 
Dr.	Rob	Person	is	an	Associate	Professor	of	International	Relations	
at	 the	United	 States	Military	Academy	in	West	 Point,	New	York,	
where	 he	 teaches	 courses	 in	 Russian	 and	 post-Soviet	 politics,	
international	 relations,	 and	 comparative	 politics	in	
the	Department	 of	 Social	 Sciences.	 Additionally,	 he	 serves	 as	
Director	 of	 Curriculum	 for	 West	 Point's	 International	 Affairs	
Program,	as	well	 as	Director	of	Research	 for	 the	Department	of	
Social	Sciences.	Dr.	Person’s	research	focuses	on	the	foreign	and	
domestic	politics	of	Russia	and	 the	 former	Soviet	 states.	He	has	
published	 extensively	 on	 regime	 support,	 mass	 mobilization,	
hybrid	warfare,	and	the	international	relations	of	the	post-Soviet	









Ms. Nicole Peterson 
Nicole	Peterson	is	an	Analyst	who	assists	in	qualitative	research	and	
strategic	 analysis	 in	 support	 of	 Strategic	 Multi-Layer	 Assessment	





extremist	 organizations	 to	 artificial	 intelligence.	 She	 is	 also	 the	
publisher	 of	 SMA’s	 weekly	 newsletter,	 which	 summarizes	 SMA	
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